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ABSTRACT 
This study identifies factors which are influential in 
determining management's choice of the timing of an accounting 
disclosure (the release of cash flow information; that is, the 
adoption of SFAS No. 95.) This disclosure does not affect 
reported net earnings. Several of the factors which have been 
shown to affect management's choice of accounting procedures 
that do affect reported net income are shown here to affect 
disclosure choice. The unique contribution of this study is 
the extension of the positive accounting theory of choice into 
the area of non-income-affecting disclosure choices, 
specifically cash flow disclosure. 
Size, the degree of management's control and the 
percentage change in a performance measure (cash flow from 
operations) are shown by univariate methods to significantly 
influence management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95, 
entitled "statement of Cash Flows." A relatively unexplored 
variable, the value of management's stock options, was found 
to influence this choice. A mUltivariate procedure, LOGIT, 
was significant at the level of the overall model. The 
importance of one variable, the basis of the funds statement 
in the year prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 95, dominated 
the other variables. with this variable removed, the overall 
model remained significant and the individual variables of the 
change in cash flows form operations and the degree of 
management control were significant. 
Chapter One 
The Research Question, overview o~ the study, and 
Expected contributions of the study 
The primary purpose of the proposed study is to develop 
a model to explain and predict management· s choice of adoption 
date of statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95, 
entitled "statement of Cash Flows" (SFAS No. 95) [FASB 
(1987) ]. Since the seminal work of watts and Zimmerman (1978) 
a considerable literature has developed regarding management's 
choices of accounting methods [e. g., cushing and LeClere 
(1992), Ayres (1986), Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)] and of 
disclosures [e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren (1987)]. Certain 
variables have been shown to influence management's choice of 
accounting procedures and of disclosures across a variety of 
research areas. However, no work specifically has addressed 
management's choice of disclosing cash flow infonnation. If 
the same factors motivating choices affecting both income and 
cash flows, or income alone, can be shown to motivate cash 
disclosures, the literature in both the areas of positive 
accounting theory and of the importance of cash flow 
information relative to earnings information can be expanded 
significantly. 
This chapter will highlight the reasons for the recent 
interest in cash flows, the concept that cash flows act as 
signals, and the factors identified in the positive accounting 
literature as having influence in many applications. These 
1 
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are discussed in greater depth in Chapters Two and Three. The 
sample selection and statistical methods employed are 
discussed in Chapter Three. Results and conclusions are 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five. This chapter will 
conclude with the expected contributions of the study. 
1.1 RECENT INTEREST IN CASH FLOWS 
When the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) was 
created, one of its missions was to develop a conceptual 
framework for the analysis of accounting objectives and 
procedures. In 1978, the FASB issued statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No.1, entitled "Objectives of Financial 
Reporting by Business Enterprises" (SFAC No.1) [FASB (1978) J. 
This statement concludes that a major purpose of financial 
reporting is to provide information useful in assessing the 
amounts and likelihood of a firm's future cash flows. The 
FASB added, in April 1985, the possibility of replacing the 
funds statement with a statement of cash flows to its agenda 
of possible standards statements. The discussion period that 
followed showed wide support for a statement of cash flows. 
Cash flows were made a mandatory disclosure for firms with 
fiscal periods ending after July 15, 1988 [FASB (1987) para. 
34J. 
1.2 IMPORTANCE OF CASH FLOW INFORMATION 
Even though the FASB mandated the inclusion of a 
statement of cash flows as part of a full set of financial 
statements, it maintained that accrual-based earnings 
statements provided superior information on which to assess 
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the amounts and likelihood of a firm's future cash flows. A 
literature developed addressing the question of the importance 
of cash flows 1 • Early results of inve~tigations were mixed, 
but later studies supported the idea that investors valued the 
information in a cash flow statement in addition to the 
information in accrual earnings statements. 
1.3 CASH FLOWS AND SIGNALING 
During and somewhat before the time period of increased 
interest in cash flows by the accounting community, 
researchers in the areas of economics and finance [ e. g. , 
Asquith and Mullins (1986)] began to search for reasons why 
investors should value the receipts of cash dividends. A 
frequent conclusion of the research was that the payment of 
cash dividends constituted a clear, unmistakable signal that 
management had access to information that lead management to 
believe that the future cash-generating prospects of the firm 
were greater than might appear from other signals, such as 
published financial reports. Researchers in the accounting 
area [e.g., Lev and Penman (1990)] investigated the voluntary 
release of forecasts by management and concluded that 
management issued forecasts as signals of a company's future 
cash-generating prospects. 
1.4 ROBUST HYPOTHESIS OF POSITIVE ACCOUNTING 
Researchers of the factors influencing management's 
choice of accounting procedures that have an effect on 
A review of this work is given in Neill et. al (1991). 
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reported accounting income have identified four factors that 
proved to be influential in a variety of applications (e.g., 
Watts and Zimmerman [1978], Ayres [1986]). These factors are: 
Managements' Compensation Effects, Existence and Tightness of 
Restrictive Debt Covenants, Degree of Autonomy granted 
Management, and Size of the firm. (These are descriptive 
names, not the nomenclature of the positive accounting 
studies). Some investigations have been conducted in areas 
that do not involve choices that have an effect on reported 
accounting income [e. g., Chow (1982)] and on management's 
choice of disclosures [e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren (1987)]. The 
same four factors have been found significant in explaining 
these choices that do not involve reported accounting income. 
1.5 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
The expected contributions of the proposed study 
include: 
1. If the same factors proven influential in 
management's choice of adoption date of accounting procedures 
that affect reported net income also are found to be 
influential in management's choice of disclosure date of cash 
flow information, the inference will be that managers believe 
that cash flows are valued in the same way that income 
information is valued. This will add to the literature 
concerning the importance of cash flows. 
2. Hypothesizing that the scenario expressed in (1) 
above is confirmed, the implication is that managers view the 
disclosure of cash flow information as the issuing of a 
5 
signal. This will tie the signaling literature, which is 
principally in the finance area, to the accounting area, 
expanding the literature in both fields. 
3. positive accounting research has assumed that 
management is motivated by self interest to the point that 
they will make choices that add to their welfare at the 
expense of stockholders and others with an interest in the 
firm. However, positive accounting theory as envisioned by 
watts and Zimmerman (1990) allows for the distinct possibility 
that managers make choices that benefit all those with an 
interest in the firm (e. g., stakeholders). The proposed study 
includes a direct test of the two different views of 
management's motivation. 
4. Evidence that helps to explain and predict 
management's choice of disclosures should prove valuable to 
authoritative and regulatory bodies, such as the FASB and the 
securities and Exchange commission, in proposing new standards 
or regulations or in evaluating existing standards and 
regulations. 
5. Investors and financial analysts have reason to 
value any information explaining the disclosure choices made 
by management, as such information may influence their 
resource allocation decisions. 
6. The proposed study includes a variable that has not 
been examined sufficiently in prior research to include it in 
the list of robust hypotheses. This variable is the value of 
stock options held by management. The inclusion of stock 
6 
options as an explanatory variable in this study will add to 
the positive accounting literature. 
7. The proposed study will extend the positive theory 
of accounting choice into the cash flow area. 
Chapter Two 
Relevant Prior Research 
This chapter will review relevant literature concerning 
cash flows and the objectives of financial reporting, the 
development of cash flow reporting requirements, the 
importance of disclosures as signaling devices and the 
implications of the positive theory of accounting choice on 
management's decision to disclose cash flows. 
2.1 CASH FLOWS AND THE OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL 
REPORTING 
Decision usefulness can be stated as the overall 
objective of financial reporting. "User relevance" [Neill et 
ale (1991), 117] is an alternative wording of this concept. 
This is expressed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) in statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.1, 
entitled "Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises" (SFAC No.1) [FASB (1978)] as: 
Financial reporting should provide information 
that is useful to present and potential investors 
and creditors and other users in making rational 
investment, credit, and similar decisions. The 
information should be comprehensible to those who 
have a reasonable understanding of business and 
economic activities and are willing to study the 
information with reasonable diligence (para. 34). 
Information useful in assessing future cash flows is 
identified specifially as valued information in SFAC No.1: 
Financial reporting should provide information 
to help present and potential investors and creditors 
and oth:";r users in assessing the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective cash receipts from dividends 
or interest and the proceeds from the sale, redemption, 
7 
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or maturity of securities or loans. The prospects for 
those cash receipts are affected by an enterprise's 
ability to generate enough cash to meet its obligations 
when due and its other cash operating needs, to reinvest 
in operations, and to pay cash dividends and may also 
be affected by perceptions of investors and creditors 
generally about that ability, which affect market 
prices of the enterprise's securities. Thus, financial 
reporting should provide information to help investors, 
creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the 
related enterprise (para. 37). 
The accrual basis of accounting is considered in SFAC No. 1 to 
provide information superior to that of a statement showing 
cash flows: lIinformation about enterprise earnings and its 
components measured by accrual accounting generally provides 
a better indication of enterprise performance than information 
about current cash receipts and payments ..• (para. 44) II; II ..• 
financial statements that show only cash receipts and payments 
during a short period, such as a year,. canno't adeq.:.ately 
indicate whether or not an enterprise's performance is 
successful ... (para. 43).11 
Six years after the release of SFAC No.1, the FASB 
concluded in SFAC No.5, entitled IIRecognition and Measurement 
in Financial statements of Business Enterprises" [FASB (1984)] 
that "... a full set of financial statements for a period 
should show •.. cash flows during the period ••. (para. 13)." 
The FASB maintained in SFAC No. 5 the position that an accrual 
basis statement is superior for assessing future performance: 
.•. but a cash flow statement provides an incomplete 
basis for assessing prospects for future cash flows 
because it cannot show inter-period relationships 
.•. statements of earnings and comprehensive income, 
especially if used in conjunction with statements of 
financial position, usually provide a better basis 
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for assessing future cash flow prospects than do cash 
flow statements alone (para. 24). 
In 1987, the suggestion made in SFAC No.5 that a statement of 
cash flows be made a part of a full set of financial 
statements was operationalized in statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 95, entitled "statement of Cash 
Flows" (SFAS No. 95) [FASB (1987)]. The FASB's basic reason 
for requiring a statement of cash flows was that the existing 
emphasis on working capital was deemed unsatisfactory in 
meeting the requirements of SFAC No. 1 and SFAC No.5. 
Comments received during the exposure draft period aided in 
this conclusion: 
To achieve those objectives requires that the 
statement focus on flows of cash rather than flows 
of working capital. An overwhelming majority of 
respondents agreed with that focus. Many made 
negative comments on the usefulness or working 
capital as a concept of funds, generally question-
ing its relevance since positive working capital 
does not necessarily indicate liquidity nor does 
negative working capital necessarily indicate 
illiquidity [FASB (1987), para. 50]. 
Before and following the release of SFAS No. 95, "A 
continuing controversy concerning the measurement and 
reporting of firm performance revolves around the fundamental 
issue of how to provide the best information for assessing 
future cash flows [Neill et ale (1991), 117]." Neill at ale 
(1991) state further that: 
The role of cash flow information is central 
to our understanding of how the market responds 
to the fundamental accrual notion underlying 
modern financial reporting. It may be the case 
that some of the accountant's allocations of 
cash flows across time periods provide new and 
useful data while others may only obscure 
economic reality. It is hoped that careful 
research on cash flows and accruals will 
continue to contribute to the emerging liter-
ature and our understanding of the economic 
role of accounting information (pg. 145). 
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The proposed study will contribute to our understanding 
of the role of cash flow information in the economy by 
gathering evidence that supports or refutes the proposition 
that managers believe cash flow information is perceived by 
investors in the same manner as earnings information. 
2.2 PROGRESSION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR CASH 
FLOWS 
When the FASB released SFAC No. 1 in 1978, existing 
reporting requirements for a full set of financial statements 
consisted of a balance sheet, an income statement, and a 
statement of changes in financial position. The statement of 
changes in financial position (frequently called the funds 
statement) was made a part of a full set of financial 
statements by Accounting Principles Board opinion No. 19 (APB 
No. 19), entitled "Reporting Changes in Financial Position" 
[AICPA 1972)]. The funds statement was a two-part statement, 
reporting "Sources and Uses of Funds." Funds could be defined 
in a number of ways; working capital was the most frequent 
definition (see Table 1). The FASB's basic reason for 
replacing the funds statement with a statement of cash flows, 
as discussed in section 2.1, was that the existing emphasis on 
working capital was deemed unsatisfactory in meeting the 
objectives of SFAC No. 1 and SFAC No. 5 to provide information 
useful in assessing future cash flows. In addition, specific 
reasons for changing existing practice as given in FASB No. 95 
11 
included limiting diversity of practice: 
.•. certain problems have been identified in current 
practice, including the ambiguity of terms such as funds 
(emphasis in the original), lack of comparability arising 
from diversity in the focus of the statement (cash, cash 
and short-term investments, quick assets, or working capital) 
and the resulting differences in definitions of funds flows 
from operating activities (cash or working capital) 
differences in the format of the statement (sources and uses 
format or activity format), variations in classifications or 
specific items in an activity format, and the reporting of net 
changes in amounts of assets and liabilities rather than gross 
inflows and outflows. The lack of clear objectives for the 
statement of changes in financial position has been suggested 
as a major cause of that diversity (para. 2). 
The definition of cash in the statement of cash flows 
prescribed by SFAS No. 95 allows for little variation 
(paragraphs 7 10) • In general, cash flows are to be 
reported gross as opposed to net (paragraphs 11 - 13). The 
reporting format is to be three-part: cash receipts and cash 
payments classified into investing, financing, and operating 
activities (para. 14). Detailed guidance and prescription is 
given regarding the classification of specific cash receipts 
and cash payments into the three categories (paragraphs 15 -
27). The resulting cash flow statement differs considerably 
from the former funds statement, as shown in Exhibits 1 and 2. 
SFAS No. 95 contains a section entitled "Appendix A: 
Background Information." The following his·tory of the 
progression of cash flow reporting requirements is drawn from 
that section (paragraphs 35 - 43): 
In December 1980, the FASB issued a discussion 
memorandum, entitled "Reporting Cash Flows, Liquidity, and 
Financial Flexibility" [FASB (1980)]. This discussion 
memorandum raised the question of the focus of the funds flow 
12 
statement (or statement of Changes in Financial Position): Is 
working capital an adequate focus, or should the focus be cash 
(para. 35)? In November 1981, the FASB issued an exposure 
draft of a proposed SFAC, entitled "Reporting Income, Cash 
Flows, and Financial Position of Business Enterprises" [FASB 
(1981) ] . This exposure draft concluded that cash and not 
working capital should be the focus of funds flow reporting 
(para. 36). In December, 1984, SFAC No.5, entitled 
"Recognition and Measurement in Financial statements of 
Business Enterprises ll [FASB (1984)], was issued. This SFAC, 
which was released in exposure draft form three years earlier 
[FASB (1981)], concluded that, in concept, a cash flow 
statement should be part of a full set of financial statements 
(para. 36). Details of cash flow reporting issues (including 
the format of a cash flow statement) were not addressed in the 
concepts statements. They were addressed only in the 
Standards statements. The FASB took this approach in part to 
allow the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) to conduct 
research of its own (para. 37). 
In late 1981, the FEI encouraged its members to change 
from a working capital focus in their funds statements to a 
focus on cash and short-term investments. The FEI also 
encouraged enterprises to experiment with alternative formats, 
such as the grouping of items by operating, investing and 
financing activities. This experimentation was in keeping 
with the authoritative literature, APB No. 19, which allowed 
flexibility in the focus and form of the statement. In 1984, 
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the FEI's research affiliate, the Financial Executives 
Research Foundation, published a research study, entitled "The 
Funds Statement: structure and Use," that analyzed the 
results of thf'; experimentation encouraged by the FEI (para. 
38). ' Different definitions of cash and cash flow from 
operations were encountered, as well as different methods of 
presentation (para. 38). 
In April, 1985, the FASB added cash flows to its agenda. 
SFAS No. 95, entitled "statement of Cash Flows," was released 
in exposure draft form in July 1986 (para. 41). The exposure 
draft proposed standards for cash flow reporting that required 
a statement of cash flows as part of a full set of financial 
statements, in place of a funds statement. SFAS No. 95 was 
released in final form in November 1987, with an effective 
date of fiscal years ending after July 15, 1988 (para. 34). 
Based on the events described above, a calendar-year 
firm could have adopted a cash flow statement in 1987 or 1988 
and could have adopted a cash-basis funds statement in 1980, 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 or 1987. It also is 
possible for a firm to have adopted a cash-basis funds 
statement prior to 1980, as APB No. 19 permitted that,basis. 
These possible adoption dates for a calendar-year firm are 
shown in Table 2. 
summary: 
Cash flow reporting requirements were instituted in 
response to the objective of financial reporting, as stated in 
SFAC No.1, that financial reporting should help users "in 
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assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective 
cash receipts [FASB (1978) para. 37].11 The existing 
emphasis on working capital was deemed inappropriate. Firms 
were encouraged to disclose cash flows prior to the effective 
date of FASB No. 95. As discussed in the next section, firms 
may have elected early disclosure of cash flows in order to 
signal investors of the firm's future cash flow prospects. 
2.3 SIGNALING AND CASH FLOWS 
The concept that management might undertake an action in 
order to signal investors of their superior knowledge of the 
firm's future prospects appeared in the accounting, finance 
and economics literature with the observation in Fama et ale 
(1969) that excess returns on common stock followed a stock 
split. Fama et ale theorized that the stock split acted as a 
signal that an increase in dividends was forthcoming; if an 
increase in dividends did not materialize, the excess returns 
vanished [Fama et (1969), 17] . without saying so 
specifically, Fama et ale assumed an information asymmetry 
between investors and management. 
A direct mention of information asymmetry between buyers 
and sellers appeared in the economics literature with an 
article using the market for used cars as an example [Akerlof 
(1970)]. 
In Akerlof's example, sellers of used cars know whether their 
cars are of inferior quality (lilemons ll ). Buyers do not know 
the quality of the used cars and will offer a price reflecting 
average quality. In this market, "lemons" may drive out the 
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better cars [Akerlof (1970), 491]. Akerlof proposed that 
brand names, licensing, certification practices and diplomas 
from educational institutions serve to reduce the market's 
uncertainty over quality. Spence (1973) proposed that 
educational attainment acts as a signal of a worker's 
productivity and developed an equilibrium theory of signaling 
in job and product markets. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) proposed that entrepreneurs will 
invest in their own projects as a signal of project quality 
and built a model of signaling equilibrium based on the 
fraction of owner.ship in a project retained by the 
entrepreneur. Pastena and Ronen (1979) stated that there is 
II ••• a growing interest in the extent to which management's 
actions serve as signals (pg. 551)." Hughes (1986) extended 
Leland and Pyle's (1977) univariate signaling~odel to include 
disclosure as a second signal of value. She proposed that an 
entrepreneur will communicate inside information about a 
firm's future cash flows through a direct statement ,or 
disclosures about the firm's value. 
A number of researchers theorized that managers, under 
conditions of information asymmetry, pay dividends or 
undertake stock repurchases in order to signal their superior 
knowledge of their firm's ability to generate future cash 
flows. Results of investigations confirmed this hypothesis, 
as in the studies by Gonedes (1978), Aharony and Swary (1980), 
Miller and Rock (1985) and Mann (1989). Aharony and Swary's 
(1980) discussion of signaling activity is typical of these 
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studies: "Assuming that managers possess inside information 
about their firm's future prospects, they may use various 
signaling devices to convey this information to the public. 
Two of the most important signaling devices available are 
earnings and dividend figures (pg. 1)." Ross (1977) theorized 
that signaling activity altered the perceived risk class of 
firms that increased dividends. He stated that what was 
valued by the market was not the actual risk class of the 
firm, but was the perceived risk class of the firm. Ross 
concluded that a firm alters its financial structure in order 
to send a signal that alters the market's perception of the 
firm's risk class "even though the actual risk remains 
unchanged (pg. 25.)" 
The ability of a firm to generate cash flows would, in 
a setting characterized by complete and costless transfer of 
information (i.e., in the perfectly competitive environment of 
Modigliani and Miller [1958]), be as obvious from the other 
sources of information released concerning a firm as from the 
payment of dividends. The payment of dividends would appear 
to be an unnecessary and expensive means of communication. 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) replied to this argument with the 
assertion that the clear, understandable nature of a payment 
of cash make the payment of cash an effective signaling device 
- "other signals, such as earnings reports, are too complex 
and detailed (pg. 35)." Abdel-Khalik (1985) viewed cash flow 
as a signal in his investigation of the effect on management's 
remuneration of a switch to LIFO. He stated that " •.• the 
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LIFO change generates conflicting valuation signals in that it 
decreases the firm's reported accounting income, but increases 
its net operating cash inflows by reducing its tax liabilities 
(pg . 4 2 8) . " 
The release of voluntary forecasts by management has 
been examined from a signaling perspective. Penman (1980) 
undertook an investigation of the voluntary disclosure of 
corporate earnings forecasts in part to determine if they were 
issued by a broad spectrum of companies. He concluded that 
"it appears that only the exceptional firms issue forecasts 
(pg. 46)." Verrechia (1983) hypothesized that a manager 
decides whether to disclose a signal on the basis of the 
manager's beliefs concerning the information's effect on the 
company's stock price •. Dontoh (1989) proposed that the firm's 
decision to voluntarily disclose information depends on its 
conjectures about the beliefs held by competitors and 
investors. Lev and Penman (1990) conducted an investigation 
of forecasting versus non-forecasting firms and concluded that 
"earnings forecasts are used by managers of 'good news' firms 
in a signaling or screening scenario to screen themselves from 
other firms (pg. 55)." Trueman (1986) proposed that the 
voluntary release of earnings forecasts could serve to 
influence investors' opinions of the manager and of the 
company and thus raise firm value whether the forecast is 
"good news" or not, because releasing a forecast and then 
obtaining the forecasted position would demonstrate 
management's ability to alter production schedules in order to 
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obtain a specified result. Livnat and Zarowin (1990) include 
a section entitled "Signaling effects of financing cash flows" 
in their research on the information content of cash-flow 
components (pg. 29).11 
Dye's (1990) theoretical 
would seek to disclosures firms 
article compared 
make voluntarily 
the 
with 
"optimal" mandated disclosures in a single-period, multi-firm 
model in which there are covariances between firm's cash 
flows. He stated that the stylized representation of a firm's 
disclosure policy that he used in this article is not 
appropriate for studying voluntary earnings forecasts, were 
firms have control over the details of what is to be disclosed 
after receiving private information. "In such situations, 
signaling phenomena must be considered explicitly, whereas in 
our setting, signaling is irrelevant (emphasis added) (pg. 
5) • " 
summary I Conclusion 
A review of the relevant signaling literature reveals 
that management issues signals when they believe that such 
signals will influence investors' valuation of the firm 
favorably. Presenting information in a more readily 
understandable form is viewed as a legitimate use of 
signaling. Cash flows are viewed as signals. This study will 
posit signaling as a maintained hypothesis to explain 
management's motivation to disclose cash flow information 
earlier than the effective date of SFAS No. 95. 
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2.4 INFORMATION VALUE OF CASH FLOWS 
The basic premise of the proposed investigation is that 
managers believe investors respond to cash flow information, 
just as investors respond to accounting earnings information. 
Therefore, the same factors which have been identified in the 
literature as motivating managers to choose accounting methods 
(see section 2.5) should motivate managers to disclose cash 
flow information. 
A considerable literature 
usefulness of cash flow information. 
exists examining the 
In general, the later of 
these studies found cash flows to be useful to investors and 
thus provide support for the premise that managers believe 
that cash flow information has value to investors. The 
following four studies are representative of these later 
studies and have been selected for review in this section: 
Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1986); Bowen, Burgstahler and 
Daley (1987); Wilson (1987); and Livnat and Zarowin (1990). 
Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1986) were motivated in 
part by the findings of earlier studies2 that cash flow did 
not possess information beyond that in earnings numbers. Most 
of the prior studies measured the "information effect" in the 
same manner as did this study, by measuring the Cumulative 
Abnormal Return using event-study methodology. They found 
that "traditional" measures of cash flows used in previous 
research, such as adding back depreciation to operating net 
income and using working capital from operations as a measure 
of cash flow, were highly correlated wi th operating net 
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income. In contrast, more sophisticated measures of cash flow 
(which approximated the definition of cash from operations 
given in SFAS No. 95) had "dramatically lower" (pg. 719) 
correlations with operating net income. 
"this suggests a possible explanation 
They concluded that 
for the lack of 
significant results for the cash flow variable examined in 
some prior research and suggests that new research using 
other measures of cash flow might yield different results 
(page 719)." 
Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1987) examined the 
association between unexpected security returns and unexpected 
cash flows, after controlling for the relation between 
unexpected returns and unexpected earnings. They used a 
sophisticated measure of cash flow based on Bowen, Burgstahler 
and Daley (1986) and studies by Largay and stickney (1980) and 
Gombola and Ketz (1983). They concluded that cash flows 
possess incremental information content beyond that of accrual 
earnings. 
Wilson (1987) conducted an investigation into the 
information value of cash flows that was motivated by the 
insight that earnings were released to the financial press 
prior to the release of the annual report, which contained the 
2 Such as Ball and Brown (1968). Even a recent study in 
"Accounting and Business Research," Board and Day (1989) I used 
a simplistic measure of cash flows and concluded that cash 
flows did not possess added information value. 
21 
funds statement and sufficient data to calculate cash flows. 
He addressed the specific "question of whether the accrual and 
funds component of earnings have incremental information 
content beyond earnings itself? (pg. 319)" He concluded in 
the affirmative when funds are measured as cash from 
operath:ms. 
Livnat and Zarowin (1990) examined the unexpected stock 
price reaction to unexpected components of cash flows. 
Expected components were determined by the random-walk model; 
i. e., changes from the prior year's cash flows constituted the 
unexpected cash flow measure. This was the measure of 
unexpected cash flows used by Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley 
(1987) and by Rayburn (1986). Unexpected market returns were 
measured by the market model, using a twelve-month event 
window, again comparable to Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley 
(1987) and to Rayburn (1986). Actual amounts of cash flows 
were determined by manipulation of reported income numbers, 
funds statement numbers and balance sheet numbers. The cash 
flows thus generated were essentially in the three-part format 
of SFAS No. 95. They concluded that operating cash flows are 
strongly associated with security returns, that financing cash 
flows are associated with security returns, although the 
association is more sensitive to the time period examined and 
not as significant as that of operating cash flows, and that 
investing cash flows do not exhibit a significant association 
with security returns. 
Livnat and Zarowin (1990) performed several tests of the 
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robustness of their results. They split their sample into 
above-and-below median firms in terms of .narket value of 
equity. Their results were similar for the two groups. They 
also varied the measure of expected cash flows from the 
random-walk model to the use of prior cumulative abnormal 
returns, following the process used by Beaver, Lambert and 
Morse (1980) and by Collins, Kothari and Rayburn (1987). In 
this test, they also used quintiles based on market value to 
control 
Rayburn 
for a size effect, 
(1987) . Their 
following collins, Kothari and 
results were robust to this 
specification of unexpected cash flows and control for size 
effect. They also tested for a third specification of 
unexpected cash flows, that of Lipe (1986), in which each 
component change of cash flows in year T is predicted by using 
all changes in the components of cash flows in year T-1. 
Their results were robust to this specification of unexpected 
cash flows. 
summary 
Examinations of the information content of cash flows 
have been conducted using the same methodology as that used to 
examine the information content of accounting net income. The 
results have supported the proposition that investors value 
cash flow information in the same manner as they value 
accounting net income information. Managers would reasonably 
expect that investors would react to cash flow information and 
would consider this reaction in deciding whether to release 
cash flow information. 
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2.5 POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY 
positive accounting theory attempts to explain and 
predict accounting practice [Watts and Zimmerman (1986)]. 
This purpose of posi ti ve accounting theory is maintained 
throughout the literature. Numerous studies use expressions 
such as "as predicted by positive accounting theory." The 
primary question addressed by positive accounting theory is 
"How do accounting standards affect management's wealth? 
[Watts and Zimmerman (1978), 114]?" 
Research conducted using positive accounting theory as a 
paradigm gives the impression that positive accounting theory 
can be expressed as "Management acts in its own best (self-
serving) interests." Research conducted under this view of 
positive accounting theory has contributed to the literature 
by revealing previously unknown empirical regularities, such 
as the association between leverage and accounting method 
choice [Watts and Zimmerman (1990)]. 
positive accounting theory has been described in terms 
of what it attempts to do (explain and predict accounting 
practice) and in terms of three hypotheses: 1) The bonus 
plan, or compensation hypothesis, 2) The debt/equity, or debt 
covenant hypothesis, and 3) The size, or political cost 
hypothesis. The bonus plan, or compensation, hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that a manager's compensation under a 
bonus plan increases as reported earnings increase. "Under 
that assumption, an increase in the present value. of a firm's 
reported earnings increases the present value of the manager's 
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compensation [Watts and Zimmerman (1986),208]." The related 
hypothesis, in alternate form, is: 
Bonus plan hypothesis. ceteris paribus, manager of 
firms with bonus plans are more likely to choose 
accounting procedures that shift reported earnings 
from future periods to the current period [Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), 208]. 
The debt/equity, or debt covenant hypothesis, is based on the 
assumption that "A default on a debt contract is costly, so 
contracts that define a breach in terms of accounting numbers 
provide managers with incentives to choose accounting numbers 
that reduce the probability of a breach [Watts and Zimmerman 
(1968), 215].11 The related hypothesis, in alternate form, is: 
Debt/equity hypothesis. ceteris paribus, the larger a 
firm's debt/equity ratio, the more likely the 
firm's manager is to select accounting procedures 
that shift reported earnings from future periods 
to the current period [Watts and Zimmerman (1986), 
216]. 
The size, or political cost hypothesis, is based on the 
assumption that "large firms are more politically sensitive 
than small firms and, therefore, face differential incentives 
in their choice of accounting procedures [Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), 235]." Size is used as a proxy for sensitivity to 
political costs of regulation and taxation. The related 
hypothesis, in alternate form, is: 
Size hypothesis. ceteris paribus, the larger the 
firm, the more likely the manager is to choose 
accounting procedures that defer reported earnings 
from current to future periods [Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), 235]. 
This study will draw on the research conducted on the above 
three hypotheses, which have been confirmed over a variety of 
studies, and on a fourth empirical regularity, the observed 
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difference in the behavior of managers in firms with 
concentrated ownership cOIllpared to the behavior of managers in 
firms with more diffuse ownership, to generate hypotheses for 
the motivation of managers to disclose cash flows earlier thal"l 
the effective date of SFAS No. 95. 
Presented here is an item not found in the literature: 
a definition of positive accounting theory that is self-
contained. Existing literature consistently makes reference 
to "the positive accounting theory" but no definition exists; 
rather, the purpose of positive accounting theory (to explain 
and predict accounting practice) is given, followed by one or 
more of the hypotheses concerning management's behavior. The 
following definition is drawn from Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 
pgs. 134 137): positive accounting theory is that 
accounting choices are made to generate an Efficient set of 
accounting methods for the firm. An Efficient Set is that set 
which minimizes the firm's contracting costs. contracting 
costs are defined broadly and not yet completely identified. 
While they include agency costs of debt and equity, they also 
include 1) External transactions costs, such as underwriting 
costs of new debt issues, 2) Internal transactions costs, such 
as the cost of maintaining a transfer price system, 3) 
Poli tical process transactions costs, such as lobbying to 
avoid government regulation, 4) Information-gathering 
costs, 5) Renegotiation costs of contracts, and 6) Bankruptcy 
costs. The theory is firm-specific. That is, the relative 
magnitudes of the various contracting costs vary from firm to 
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firm. 
Positive accounting theory could be viewed as an 
extension of the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
entitled "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership structure." This paper was motivated by 
progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency and 
(3) finance and developed a theory of ownership structure for 
the firm. That theory of ownership structure can be stated as 
follows: The firm's optional ownership structure is that 
structure that minimizes agency costs. Agency costs arise 
whenever one or more persons (the principal (s» engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service and delegate some 
authority to the agent. The agent may not always act in the 
best interests of the principal. Agency costs are defined as 
the sum of (1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the 
residual loss. The residual loss is defined as the difference 
between the agent's decisions and those which would maximize 
the welfare of the principal. 
Ball and smith (1992) prefer the terminology "the 
economic consequences literature" to the terminology "the 
positive accounting literature." Both Ball and Smith (1992) 
and watts and Zimmerman (1978) trace the foundations of the 
literature to Coase (1937), which established the proposition 
that firms owe their existence to costs of contracting, and to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), which established the 
principal/agent analysis of motivation for managers' actions. 
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The literature review that follows is organized by hypothesis. 
2.51 BONUS OR COMPENSATION HYPOTHESIS 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) defined management 
compensation very broadly; including wages, bonuses, stock 
options, and nonpecuniary income, including perquisites (pg. 
114) . The literature has focused almost exclusively on 
bonuses, which are based on accounting income and thus appear 
to be related directly to accounting choices that affect 
income. Examinations in which the existence of management 
bonus plans was used as a dichotomous variable (0 = the firm 
had no bonus plan; 1 = the firm had a bonus plan) were 
conducted in the period between Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and 
Healy (1985). The results were mixed. Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981), in a search for the existence of an overall income 
strategy consisting of simultaneous choices of accounting 
methods of depreciation, inventory costing, the investment tax 
credit and the amortization of pension costs found that a 
bonus plan was significant in explaining some choices but not 
significant in explaining others. Bowen et ale (1981) 
investigated the significance of a bonus plan in explaining 
management's choice of expensing or capitalizing interest 
during the construction period of fixed assets. They based 
their investigation on the period before Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 34, entitled 
"capitalization of Interest Cost" (SFAS No. 34) [FASB (1.979)] 
required the capitalization of interest during the 
construction period of fixed assets. They found that fifty-
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one percent of the firms in their sample capitalized interest, 
and concluded that firms with bonus plans were no more likely 
to capitalize interest than firms without bonus plans. In 
determining whether a company had a bonus plan or not, they 
interpreted the absence of a clear statement that a plan 
existed to mean that a plan did not exist. Abdel-Kbalik 
(1985) conducted an examination of the effects of the change 
from FIFO to LIFO on managerial compensation. He found that 
managers' compensation did not decline for the firms that 
switched from FIFO to LIFO. He interpreted this finding to 
mean that either the terms of the bonus plan were modified, or 
that the bonus plan continued to be based on FIFO income. 
Healy (1985) appears to have changed the formulation of 
hypotheses concerning management compensation. Healy quoted 
a study made by Fox (1980) that in 1980 ninety percent of the 
1,000 largest u.s. manufacturing corporations used a bonus 
plan based on accounting earnings to remunerate managers. 
Further, even if a company has no fonnal bonus plan, managers 
might believe justifiably that their compensation is related 
to firm performance as measured by accounting numbers. 
Therefore, the use of a dichotomous ( 0/1 ) variable to 
represent compensation effects was too simplistic to yield 
meaningful results. Healy examined the bonus contracts for 94 
companies and found that a common arrangement was the use of 
a bonus pool and earnings targets. If the "lower bound" 
earnings target was met, the firm would contribute to a bonus 
pool, but only up to a specified maximum. This meant that in 
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practice there existed an "upper bound" for income, beyond 
which additional earnings did not add to the bonus pool. 
Healy' s tests lead him to conclude that "Managers are more 
likely to choose income-decreasing accruals when their bonus 
plan upper or lower bounds are binding, and income-increasing 
accruals when these bounds are not binding (pg. 106)." 
since Healy (1985), the use of dichotomous variable as 
a proxy for management compensation effects has been modified. 
A common modification is the assumption that any increase in 
firm income leads to an incre~se in compensation, as developed 
in Ayres (1986). Another modification is found in Chester 
(1991), who used a dichotomous variable for the existence of 
a bonus plan but added a dichotomous variable for the 
modification/nori."~modification of the bonus plan for changes in 
accounting procedures. Data on the existence and details of 
the plans were obtained directly from the companies in his 
sample, which was part of a study of corporate management 
support for push down accounting. An exception to the change 
in this hypothesis following Healy (1985) is Moses (1987), 
part of the income-smoothing literature, that initially was 
submitted for pUblication prior to Healy (1985). 
Ayres (1986) studied early and late adopters of 
statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 52, entitled 
"Foreign Currency Translation" (SFAS No. 52) [FASB (1981)]. 
She quoted a survey of 980 large industrial companies that 
examined the relation between the percentage change in firms' 
bonuses and the percentage change in firms' return on 
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investm(·,nt. The survey showed that a modest (0-5%) increase 
in profitability was associated with a large (35.5%) increase 
in bonuses, while profitability increases in excess of 10% led 
to only slight incremental increases in bonuses (pg. 147). 
Ayres interpreted this finding to suggest that management has 
an incentive to increase earnings, but not by a large amount. 
She hypothesized that firms that elected to adopt SFAS No. 52, 
which was an income-increasing choice in 102 and 103 cases, 
had a smaller percentage growth in earnings before the effect 
of SFAS No. 52 than did those firms which delayed adoption of 
SFAS No. 52. This hypothesis was confirmed at the .002 level 
of significance in a logistical model. 
Trombley (1989) examined the characteristics of firms 
electing early adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 86, entitled "Accounting for the Costs of 
Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed" 
(SFAS No. 86) [FASB (1985)], which required capitalization of 
software development costs for firms in the software industry. 
As a proxy for management compensation effects, he used a 
dichotomous variable for the change in earnings from the prior 
year before the effects of SFAS No. 86. Specifically, he used 
1 for a decrease in earnings or increase in loss, and 0 for an 
increase in earnings or decrease in loss. This variable was 
found significant in an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model at the .05 level. 
stock options 
A rise in the value of a firm's common stock can 
31 
contribute to the compensation of the firm's managers [Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978)]. Johnson and Revsine' (1988) state that 
"A factor that mitig~tes accounting related incentive 
conflicts between manager and stockholders is the prevalence 
of executive compensation arrangements that link managerial 
wealth to shareholder value through stock options or direct 
share ownership (pg. 96)." Ronen and Aharoni (1989) reported 
that responses to questionnaires mailed as part of their study 
of the effects of corporate tax on management's choice of 
accounting procedures indicated that management compensation 
is linked to both accounting earnings and stock prices through 
incentive plans. The questionnaires related to compensation 
plans in effect in the fiscal year ended December 31, 1979 and 
were mailed to the Fortune 1,000 companies. Of the 202 
responding companies, 13 reported an option plan only, 37 a 
bonus plan only, 142 a mixed bonus-option plan, and 10 neither 
a bonus nor an option plan. That is, 77% (155 out of 202) 
reported the use of either an option plan exclusively or the 
use of a mixture of option and bonus plans to compensate 
managers. 
DeChow and Sloan (1991) considered options in an 
examination of the behavior of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
in their final year with the firm. They hypothesized that 
CEOs would reduce discretionary spending (specifically on 
research and development [R&D]) in their final years, in order 
to increase their income-based bonuses. Their findings 
confirmed this hypothesis, but the reduction in R&D 
32 
expenditures in the CEO's final year was mitigated by the 
CEO's equity interest in the firm, which might be adversely 
affected by inadequate spending on R&D (pg. 78). 
DeChow and Sloan (1991) measured the degree of equity 
interest of a CEO in the firm by a computation of the relative 
importance of the CEO's equity interest to the CEO's non-
equity interest (salary plus bonus). Their measure of equity 
interest included stock options. The measure of equity 
interest was shares of stock owned plus 60% of stock options 
owned, both stock and options multiplied by stock price. 
Relative importance was determined by dividing equity 
ownership by salary plus bonus. They derived the 60% 
adjustment factor for stock options from simulation evidence 
discussed in Jensen and Murphy (1990) as a control for the 
smaller dollar change in the value of a stock option for a 
given dollar change in the value of the underlying stock. 
Summary 
Management compensation effects have been found 
significant in explaining management's choice of accounting 
procedures. The studies testing this effect have focused on 
the increase in management's compensation due to any increase 
in reported accounting income, assuming that virtually all 
firms have bonus plans that are tied to reported accounting 
earnings, explicitly or implicitly. The proposed study is an 
examination of early versus late adoption of SPAS No. 95, 
which is not a choice that affects reported accounting income. 
However, managers are hypothesized to view disclosures as 
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signaling devices and to believe that investors will interpret 
cash flow information in the same manner that they interpret 
accounting income information. Favorable information has been 
show to raise share prices. An increase in share prices is 
part of the bonus hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1978). 
The effect of share price on manager's compensation has not 
been investigated extensively; but preliminary results are 
positive. This study will hypothesize that managers will 
adopt SFAS No. 95 early if they believe the disclosure will be 
viewed favorably. A direct measure (number of stock options 
owned) of the effect on manager's compensation due to an 
increase in share price will be incorporated into the model. 
2.52 DEBT COVENANT HYPOTHESIS 
Debt agreements often contain restrictive covenants 
designed to limit wealth transfers between debt and equity 
holders [Jensen and Meckling (1976), watts and Zimmerman 
(1978)]. 
Common limitations include limits on the long-term debt to 
total assets ratio and limits on the interest coverage ratio. 
Dividend payments are restricted also to the pool· of 
unrestrict~d retained earnings. A number of accounting choice 
studies have hypothesized that the existence of debt 
constraints influences management's choice of discretionary 
accounting procedures. 
The extent of leverage has been found to be a significant 
variable in models that predict management's choice of 
accounting procedures. The significance of the interest 
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coverage ratio and the ratio of dividends to the pool of 
unrestricted retained earnings (dividend constraints) both 
have been supported, but not as consistently as the extent of 
leverage. 
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) used leverage, interest 
coverage and dividend constraints as explanatory variables in 
an examination of the corporate decision to capitalize 
interest. They were found significant at the .028, .089 and 
.045 levels, 
leverage to 
respectively. Lilien and Pastena (1982) used 
proxy for debt constraints in a study of 
accounting procedures of oil and gas producers and found 
leverage to be significant at the .18 level. Daley and 
Vigeland (1983) investigated the effects of debt covenants on 
management's choice of accounting for research and development 
costs and found that leverage and dividend constraints were 
significant in explaining the choice but that interest 
coverage was not. 
Ayres (1986) studied early and late adopters of SFAS No. 
52. Leverage was not hypothesized to affect management's 
choice of adoption date because the direction of the impact 
from the adoption of SFAS No. 52 was ambiguous. Although the 
earnings effect was positive, the effect on net assets 
depended upon the relation between historical and current 
exchange rates and a company's mix of monetary and non-
monetary assets. Ayres controlled for leverage by splitting 
her sample into high and low leverage groups, hypothesizing 
that interest coverage was more important to a firm with high 
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leverage. Interest coverage (controlled for leverage) and 
dividend constraints were used as proxies for debt 
constraints. Interest coverage was found significant at the 
.0325 level for the low-leveraged firms and was found 
significant at the .007 level for the highly-leveraged firms. 
Dividend constraints were found significant at the .0014 
level. 
Johnson and Ramanan (1988) investigated firms in the oil 
and gas industry that changed their accounting method from 
successful efforts to the full cost basis in the period 1970 -
76. This change affected reporting accounting income. They 
concluded that leverage and the level of exploration activity 
were significant variables, and that the year of the change 
was associated with concurrent increases in debt financing and 
exploration activity. 
Healy and Pale~u (1990) presented evidence that the debt 
covenants influence management's behavior, but not as 
predicted by positive accounting theory. They conducted an 
investigation of the effectiveness of accounting-based debt 
constraints and concluded that such constraints are 
significant influences on management's behavior, but that 
management's behavioral response is to reduce the level of 
dividends rather than to increase accounting income through 
discretionary accounting changes. 
Press and Weintrop (1990) investigated the propriety of 
leverage as a surrogate for the restrictiveness of constraints 
in debt agreements. They examined the provisions of the 
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actual debt agreements to determine nearness to the constraint 
levels. They replicated Zmijewski and Hagerman's (1981) 
income strategy test, with the addition of a leverage 
constraint indicator determined from the actual debt 
agreements. They found both their leverage constraint 
indicator and leverage to be significant in explaining 
accounting choices. They concluded that leverage proxies for 
factors in addition to accounting-based debt constraints. 
Press and Weintrop (1990) computed the Spearman rank 
correlations between the measures of leverage used in Lilien 
and Pastena (1982), Lys (1984), Bowen et ale (1981), Zmijewski 
and Hagerman (1981), Collins et ale (1981), Johnson and 
Ramanan (1988) and Chow (1982) to four measures of "actual" 
nearness to debt constraints. They found that the market 
value measures were more highly correlated to the measures of 
lIactual" constraints than were the other measures (pg. 80). 
An examination of their Table 4, page 78 reveals that Lys' 
definition and Chow's definition perform equally well and 
superior to the other measures. Lys' definition is the 
simpler of the two, and will be employed in the proposed 
study. 
Public versus private debt 
The contracting costs associated with public debt are 
considered to be higher than those associated with private 
debt [Leftwich (1981»). The difference is due to the higher 
costs of renegotiation [Smith and Warner (1979)]. The trustee 
of a public bond issue cannot renegotiate the terms of the 
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indenture without the approval of the bondholders. Usually 
two-thirds of the bondholders must agree to the revised terms 
[Smith dnd Warner (1979), 151]. Private debt can be 
renegotiated relatively simply. 
Daley and vigeland (1983) investigated the effects of 
debt covenants on management's choice of accounting for 
research and development expenses. They developed a model to 
explain the choice which incorporated measures for both public 
debt and private debt. They reported that both the public 
debt and the private debt variables were positive and 
significant at the .05 level. As predicted, the public debt 
variable coefficient was larger, but the difference between 
public and private debt was not significant at the .10 level 
(pg. 204). 
Summary 
Debt covenant constraints have been found significant in 
explaining management's choice of accounting procedures that 
affect earnings, assets, and the earnings available for 
dividends. The proposed study is an examination of choice of 
adoption date of SFAS No. 95, which does not affect earnings, 
assets or the earnings available for dividends. However, cash 
flows are hypothesized to act as signals that influence 
investors' perceptions of a firm's risk class. This study 
will hypothesize that managers of firms will be influenced in 
their decision of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 by the 
existence of debt covenant constraints. Lys' (1984) measure 
of leverage will be used as a proxy for debt covenant 
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constraints. In addition, the model developed to predict 
manager's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 will 
incorporate measures both of public debt and of private debt, 
because the contracting costs associated with these types of 
debt vary significantly. 
2.53 SIZE (POLITICAL COST) HYPOTHESIS 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argued that larger firms were 
more sensitive to political costs such as regulation, anti-
trust legislation, and excess profits taxes. Therefore, 
larger firms were hypothesized to elect income-decreasing 
accounting methods in an effort to avoid the attention of 
politicians and regulatory agencies. Many studies have 
hypothesized size to have an effect on the object of study. 
The following five studies are representative of those 
studies which hypothesized size to be a proxy for political 
costs and found the proxy to be significant: (1) Blacconiere, 
Bowen, Sefcik and Stinson (1991), which was an examination of 
the factors influencing management's voluntary adoption of 
Regulatory Accounting Principles in the Savings and Loan 
industry; (2) Ayres (1986), which was an examination of the 
factors influencing management's choice of adoption date of 
SFAS No. 52; (3) Daley and Vigeland (1983), which was an 
examination of the facto~s influencing management's choice of 
accounting treatment for research and development costs; (4) 
Lilien and Pastena (1982), which was an examination of the 
factors influencing management's choices of the specific 
proc~dures used in applying either the full cost or the 
successful efforts method before 
specified by the Securities and 
39 
these procedures were 
Exchange Commission in 
Accounting Series Release No. 258; and (5) Zmij ewski and 
Hagerman (1981), which was an investigation of the existence 
of an overall income strategy by management that consisted of 
simultaneous choices of accounting methods for depreciation, 
inventory costing, the investment tax credit, and amortization 
of pension costs. In each of these studies, political costs 
appeared to override management compensation (bonus) effects 
in that larger companies tended to chose income-decreasing 
strategies. 
This was not the result found in Bowen, Noreen and Lacey 
(1981), a study of the factors influencing management's choice 
of accounting treatment given interest costs during 
construction (in the time period before capitalization was 
required by SFAS No. 34). This study showed that larger 
companies in the petroleum industry adopted capitalization, as 
the political costs hypothesis suggested. However, these 
findings were unique to the petroleum industry. Large 
companies in other industries were no more likely to choose 
capitalization than they were to choose expensing. 
Trombley (1989) found size to be significant, but not 
because of the political costs hypothesis. He studied the 
factors influencing the choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 
86, which required capitalization of software development 
costs by companies in the software industry. None of the 
companies appeared large enough to attract political 
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attention. "The results of this study show that the size 
effect persists even in a sample of small firms, suggesting 
that size reflects factors other than political costs (pg. 
530)." One alternative hypothesis advanced by Trombley was 
the argument of Ataise (1985) that information dissemination 
is less complete for smaller firms in part because there are 
fewer analysts and institutional investors following smaller 
firms. 
Bamber (1987) investigated the relation between firm 
size and trading volume around the announcement of quarterly 
earnings. She found that after controlling for unexpected 
earnings, firm size is related inversely to trading volume. 
She theorized that this was due to the higher volume of pre-
disclosure information that was available for the larger 
firms; the "unexpected earnings" are anticipated by more 
investors for the larger firms. 
Cushing and LeClere (1992) examined the factors 
influencing management's choice of FIFO versus LIFO inventory 
procedures. They theorized that size could be a proxy for the 
higher bookkeeping costs associated with the LIFO method. If 
larger companies exhibit economies of scale in their 
accounting departments, the added bookkeeping costs for LIFO 
would be less of a concern for these companies than for 
smaller firms. This was confirmed by the results of a survey 
asking managers which items were of concern to them in 
selecting an inventory method. "The firms of the 21 FIFO 
respondents citing concern about LIFO bookkeeping costs had 
41 
significantly lower average net sales than other FIFO firms 
(pg.362)." 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) investigated the factors that 
might motivate Mexican firms to voluntarily disclose 
information. Size was found to be a significant factor 
favoring disclosure. They hypothesized agency costs as an 
explanation. That is, as argued in Jensen & Meckling (1976), 
disclosures tend to reduce agency costs and the effect of 
agency costs is higher for larger companies because larger 
companies tend to have more outside capital. 
investigated the characteristics of firms 
Chow (1982) 
that elected 
external audits in 1926, before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission mandated external audits for large public 
companies. Size and debt covenants were found significant. 
Nei ther of these studies were concerned with management's 
choice of procedures that affect reported accounting earnings. 
Wong (1988) investigated the factors that influence the 
placement within the financial statements of New Zealand 
companies of the New Zealand export tax credit. The New 
Zealand Income Tax Act of 1976 provided "export market 
development and tourist promotion incentive" credits of 67.5% 
of qualified expenditures and allowed "export performance 
incentive" tax credits of from 1.4% to 11.9%, depending on New 
Zealand content, of the sales price of exported goods. The 
credits were offset against the income tax otherwise payable, 
and any unabsorbed credit was refundable to the taxpayer. Two 
methods were allowed in reporting the tax credits in the 
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income statement: as a reduction of income tax expense or as 
an increase in sales. A financial statement user would 
calculate a different effective income tax rate for the firm 
dependept upon the placement of the tax credit. 
The political climate in New Zealand was such that 
public attention was drawn to companies' effective tax rate. 
"Intra-period accounting numbers have no impact of the 'bottom 
line' (i.e., net income) or on asset and liability numbers, 
but they affect components of the net income number which, in 
turn, could have economic consequences (pg . 37). " Wong 
hypothesized that political pressures would lead larger 
companies to elect the increase in sales method. This 
hypothesis was confirmed. Wong further hypothesized that 
companies that are nearer to their interest coverage ratio 
constraints would be more likely to use the increase in sales 
method. This hypothesis also was confirmed. 
Summary 
Size has been shown to be a significant factor 
influencing management's choice of accounting procedures that 
affect income. In addition, size has been shown to influence 
management's choices of placement within the financial 
statements of items that do not affect income. Size also has 
been shown to be a significant factor in determining 
investors' reaction to earnings disclosures, and in 
influencing management's choice of voluntary disclosures as 
well. 
This study will hypothesize that size has a significant 
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positive relationship to management's choice of adoption date 
of SFAS No. 95. This study will not hypothesize political 
costs to be of significance because politicians are presumed 
to be influenced by the income numbers reported by the mass 
media and not by cash flows. However, there may be 
sUbstantial information production costs associated with 
adopting cash flow reporting. These costs would be 
proportionately less for a larger company. 
2.54 MANAGEMENT CONTROL (CORPORATE OWNERSHIP) 
HYPOTHESIS 
The concept that the degree of ownership of a firm by 
its managers influences the accounting and reporting choices 
of the firm has been traced by Dhaliwal, Salamon and smith 
(1982) to Williamson (1984), to Monsen and Downs (1965), to 
Smith (1976), and to Salamon and smith (1979). The basic 
argument is that managers of firms whose ownership is diffuse 
(management controlled firms) have considerable discretion in 
guiding the affairs of the firm as contrasted with the 
discretionary power of managers in firms whose ownership is 
concentrated (owner controlled firms). In the positive 
accounting literature, the seminal study is Dhaliwal, Salamon 
and Smi~h (1982). 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and smith (1982) integrate the 
arguments of managerial economists (such as Williamson [1964]) 
with those of positive accounting theory to generate the 
prediction that management controlled firms are more likely 
than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting procedures 
that increase reported accounting earnings. The theory that 
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the type of ownership has an impact upon the discretionary 
accounting choices made by managers is in contrast to the 
theory in the finance literature [Fama (1980)] that managers 
always bear the full cost of failing to maximize firm value 
and thus would be reluctant to elect accounting procedures 
that did not maximize this value. The finance theory predicts 
that no difference would be expected in the accounting methods 
adopted by management controlled and owner controlled firms. 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and smith (1982) undertook this study 
"to help determine whether the positive theory of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) .... or the theory of Fama (1980) that the 
market for managerial talent is efficient has the more 
predictive ability in the context of the problem of accounting 
method choice (pg. 45)." The study employed the same sample 
used in smith (1976): 150 firms drawn at random from those 
listed in the 1955 U.S. Senate Staff Report entitled "Factors 
Affecting the Stock Market." This U.S. Senate Staff Report 
contained essentially all the firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange in December, 1954. Firms were classified as 
owner controlled if one party owned 10% or more of the voting 
stock and exercised active control, or if one party owned 20% 
or more of the voting stock. Active control was defined as 
service on the board of directors or as an officer. A firm 
was classified as management controlled if no single block of 
stock greater than 5% was controlled by any party. The 
accounting choice examined was the depreciation method 
(accelerated for both book and taxes, accelerated for taxes 
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and straight-line for book, and straight-line for both book 
and taxes). The prediction model was a probit model in which 
the depreciation choice was the dependent variable and size, 
leverage and type of corporate ownership were the independent 
variables. The entire probit model was significant at the. 01 
level and the corporate ownership variable was significant at 
the .03 level (pg. 51). 
Following the publication of Dhaliwal, Salamon and smith 
(1982), several positive accounting studies have included a 
variable for corporate ownership. Ayres (1986) examined the 
factors affecting management's choice of adoption date of SFAS 
No. 52. As a proxy for corporate ownership, she used the 
percentage of common stock owned by officers and directors as 
a group. She found it to be significant at the .023 level. 
Trombley (1989) investigated the factors influencing 
management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 86. He used 
the same proxy measure of corporate ownership as did Ayres 
(1986). He did not find corporate ownership to be a 
significant variable; however, he believed that this might be 
due partly to its high correlation (significant at the .01 
level) with size. 
Ruland, Tung and George (1990) investigated the factors 
associated with the voluntary disclosure of management's 
forecasts of earnings. They defined corporate ownership as 
did Ayres (1986). Corporate ownership was found significant 
at the .001 level in a probit model developing the probability 
of the voluntary disclosure of earnings by management. They 
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also found that the release of a forecast of earnings was 
significantly (.028 level) associated with the raising of new 
capital by the forecasting firm. The issuance of new stock or 
new debt within three months of the release of the forecast 
was a dichotomous variable in their model. Data on new 
capital offerings was obtained from The Directory of Corporate 
Financing. 
Other studies in which the degree of corporate ownership 
by management was found significant include Dunne (1990), 
which defined corporate ownership as did Ayres (1986); Dyl 
(1989), which defined corporate ownership as the percentage of 
stock owned by the single largest stockholder; and Adbel-
Khalik (1985), which defined corporate ownership as did 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and smith (1982). 
Niehaus (1989) investigated management's choice of FIFO 
or LIFO inventory costing. He used percentage of ownership to 
develop ownership concentration ratios. He used the Fortune 
500 corporate Data Exchange stock ownership Directory, which 
lists the percentage of common shares, by name of owner, for 
any party that holds more than 0.2% of the firm's outstanding 
shares. He matched the owners with the names of the officers 
and directors of the firms in his sample and classified any 
owner who was not an officer or director as being an 
"outsider." He included a variable for "outside ownership 
concentration", consisting of the percentage of stock owned by 
the five largest outside holders, in a logit model. The logi~ 
model also included a measure of managerial (or insider) 
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ownership concentration constructed in similar fashion, along 
with measures of size and leverage. 
Niehaus (1989) observed a "range effect." His results 
suggested that LIFO was more likely to be chosen when 
managerial ownership is very high or very low, and that FIFO 
is more likely to be chosen when manag~~rial ownership is in 
the middle-ranges. He concluded that this "range effect" 
explained why Hunt (1985) found that the likelihood of LIFO 
was related inversely to managerial ownership. In the low 
range, Hunt (1985) was confirmed; in the high range, Hunt 
(1985) was contradicted (pg. 281). 
summary 
In general, the hypothesis that the behavior of managers 
in firms in which ownership is diffuse differs from that of 
managers in firms with more concentrated ownership has been 
supported. In addition, there is some support for the concept 
that the issuance of new capital shortly after the adoption of 
a new accounting procedure is associated with management's 
choice of that accounting procedure. 
The proposed study is an investigation of the factors 
influencing management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 
95. The release of information concerning cash flows has been 
viewed as a signal. The proposed study will hypothesize that 
management will be motivated to adopt SFAS No. 95 early if 
they anticipate the issuance of new capital shortly after the 
adoption. The influence of the degree of management control 
on management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 is a 
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complex issue, the resolution of which constitutes a major 
contribution of the prct)osed study. The hypothesized relation 
between the degree of management control and management's 
choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 will be explored in 
depth in Chapter Three. 
2.6 AUDITOR EFFECTS ON MANAGEMENT'S C~OICES 
One explanation for observed accounting and disclosure 
choices, particularly where management is essentially 
indifferent about the choice, is the preferences of other 
participants in the financial reporting process. Trombley 
(1989) found that the position taken by a firm's auditors in 
lobbying the FASB concerning SFAS No. 86 while it was in the 
exposure draft period was related to the firm's choice of 
adoption date of SFAS No. 86. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) 
found that the firm's outside auditor had an influence upon 
the firm's likelihood of correcting previously reported 
quarterly earnings. The proposed study will hypothesize that 
the firm's outside auditor has an effect upon the firm's 
choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has examined authoritative pronouncements 
and published research to establish that the information 
contained in a statement of cash flows is considered highly 
relevant to present and potential investors, creditors and 
other users in making rational investment, credit and similar 
decisions. The literature reviewed in this Chapter leads to 
the conclusion that disclosures by management are valued 
signals of their superior knowledge of the firm's future 
prospects. The positive accounting literature was reviewed 
specifically because that literature is rich in variables that 
have been demonstrated to influence management's choices of 
accounting and disclosures. 
The review of all the research and authoritative 
pronouncements in this chapter leads to the identification of 
the following factors that should be expected to influence 
management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95: 
1. The belief by managers that they have "good 
news" to report. 
2. The existence of a compensation scheme that 
rewards managers for any increases in the 
firm's stock price. 
3. The existence of debt, both public and private, 
in the firm's capital structure, and the 
related tightness of the debt covenant 
constraints. 
4. The relative ease with which the firm can 
assemble cash flow information. 
5. The degree of autonomy given managers in 
exercising their discretionary powers. 
6. The firm's outside auditor. 
operationalization of these measures, the development of 
specific hypotheses, and the development of a model to explain 
and predict management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 
95 will be explained in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Three 
Development of Model and statement of Hypotheses 
In late 1981 both the FASB and the FEI encouraged firms 
to change the focus of their funds statements from working 
capital to cash basis, and to experiment with the 
'classification of funds into operating, financing and 
investing categories. As shown in Table 1, a number of firms 
swi tched the focus of their funds statement from working 
capital to cash in 1981. The effective date of SFAS No. 95 
was fiscal years ending on or after July. 15, 1988. Firms were 
encouraged to adopt SFAS No. 95 earlier than the effective 
date and to restate the previous year to conform to SFAS No. 
95 [FASB (1987) para. 34]. Although there are significant 
format, classificacional and (possibly) definitional 
differences (see Exhibits 1 and 2) between a funds statement 
prepared on the cash basis and a cash flow statement prepared 
in accordance with SFAS No. 95, the overwhelming difference is 
the emphasis on cash rather than working capital. Details of 
the sample selected for examination and of the statistical 
methods to be employed are given in sections 3.9 and 3.10 of 
this Chapter. 
Previous research has established that managers will 
disclose information if they believe that it will cause an 
increase in the firm's share price, and that investors react 
to cash flow information in the same manner as they react to 
earnings information. The positive accounting literature 
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documents several factors that have been shown to influence 
manager's choices of accounting procedures and of disclosures. 
This chapter will ~dentify those factors which should be 
expected to influence management's choice of adoption date of 
SFAS No. 95 and develop a model to explain and predict this 
choice. 
The idea that the possessor of superior information will 
signal what he knows to achieve some economic benefit has been 
studied by a number of researchers in a variety of 
institutional settings. For example, Verrecchia (1983) argued 
that a manager will decide what information to disclose on the 
basis of his estimate of the effect of the signal on the price 
of the firm's stock. Akerlof (1970) introduced the concept 
that signaling 
markets. Ross 
occurs 
(1977) 
to alter the risk class of product 
states that what is valued in the 
financial marketplace is not the actual risk class of the 
firm, but the perceived risk class of the firm, and that a 
firm may issue a signal that alters its perceived risk class 
but not its actual risk class. 
A number of researchers have concluded that investors 
react to cash flow information as well as to earnings 
information. For example, Bowen et ale (1987), Wilson (1987), 
and Livnat and Zarowin (1990) each conducted tests of the 
market's reaction to cash flow and earnings information and 
concluded that the market valued the information in cash flows 
in addition to the information in accounting earnings reports. 
This study posits that managers view the disclosure of cash 
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flow information as the issuing of a signal. 
3.1 BONUS OR COMPENSATION HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis that managers whose compensation depends 
in par~ on bonuses based on accounting net income will tend to 
select income-increasing alternatives was proposed by watts 
and Zimmerman (1978). Healy (1985) showed that virtually all 
managers received compensation that was in some part related 
to the firm's earnings. since Healy (1985), a number of 
studies (e.g. , Ayres [1986], Trombley [1989 ]) have 
operationalized the bonus hypothesis by measuring the increase 
in firm's net income that is due to the object under 
investigation. This study will operationalize the bonus 
hypothesis in a like manner. The measure will be that of 
"good news," which has been shown to motivate managers to make 
disclosures [Lev and Penman (1990»). The measure will be the 
percentage change in cash flows over the two-year period 
ending with the adoption date. Including two years' changes 
takes into account the standard two-year comparative format in 
published financial statements. The first hypothesis, stated 
in alternative form, is: 
Firms electing early adoption 
of SFAS No. 95 will have 
increased cash flow from 
operations in the two-year 
period ending with the year of 
adoption compared to late-
adopting firms. 
Cash flow from operations (CFO) will be defined as in 
Bowen, Burgstahler and Daley (1987). They examined 
several definitions of CFO and found that naive definitions 
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(e. g., net operating income plus depreciation) were more 
highly correlated to working capital from operations than to 
more sophisticated measures of CFO. Their examination was 
motivated by the failure of studies of the information effect 
of CFO, where CFO was defined in a naive manner, to detect an 
incremental information value of CFO. Numbers are references 
to COMPUSTAT line items. 
That is: 
CFO = WCFO - ~REC - ~INV - ~OCA + ~AP + ~TP + ~OCL 
where: 
WCFO = Working capital from operations (#110) 
~ REC = change in accounts receivable during the 
period (#2) 
~ INV = change in inventories during the period 
(#3) 
~ OCA = change in other current assets during 
the period (#68) 
~ AP = change in accounts payable during 
the period (#70) 
~ TP = change in taxes payable during the 
period (#71), and 
~ OCL = change in other current liabilities 
during the period (#72) 
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3.2 DEBT COVENANT HYPOTHESIS 
The use of restrictive covenants in debt agreements to 
reduce management's ability to create wealth transfers between 
debt and equity holders has been recognized for some time 
[Jensen and Meckling (1976), watts and Zimmerman (1978)]. 
Common covenants include limits on the long-term debt to total 
assets ratio and limits on the interest coverage ratio. The 
extent of leverage, as a proxy for the existence of and 
nearness to the constraint levels of debt agreements, has been 
found to be a significant variable in models that predict 
management's choice of accounting procedures [e.g., Bowen et 
al. (1981), Johnson and Ramanan (1988)]. 
Press and Weintrop (1990) investigated the propriety of 
leverage as a surrogate for the restrictiveness of debt 
constraints by examining the provisions of the actual debt 
agreements. They computed the Spearman rank correlations 
between the measures of leverage used in seven studies to four 
measures of "actual" nearness to debt constraints. They 
concluded that the definition used in Lys (1984) and in Chow 
(1982) performed equally well and superior to the other 
measures. Lys' (1984) definition is the simpler of the two. 
Applying the principle that where two measures perform equally 
well, the simpler of the two is the preferred measure, this 
study will define leverage as did Lys (1984). 
The contracting costs associated with public debt are 
considered to be higher than those associated with private 
debt [Leftwich (1981), Smith and Warner (1979)]. The 
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difference is due to the higher costs of renegotiation of the 
public debt [Smith and Warner (1979)]. Accordingly, this 
study will include leverage measures of both public debt and 
of private debt. Determination of the classification of the 
debt will be made by the examination of proxy statements, Form 
10-K's or other public documents. 
Previous studies have hypothesized that the nearer a 
company is to violating a debt covenant, the more likely they 
are to choose accounting procedures that will increase net 
income and total assets. The decision to disclose cash flow 
information does not affect net income or total assets. 
However, payments on debt are made in cash, not on claims on 
net income. Further, disclosing information has been shown 
[Ross (1977)] to alter investors' perceptions of a firm's risk 
class. Therefore, management should be motivated to disclose 
cash flow information the nearer they are to violating a debt 
covenant agreement, if the percentage change in cash flows 
over the preceding two-year period constitutes "good news." 
The hypotheses related to debt covenants, stated in the 
alternative form, are stated in terms of a multiplicative 
variable of recent change in cash flows times nearness to debt 
covenant constraints, as follows: 
Firms electing early adoption 
of SFAS No. 95 will have higher 
levels of public debt leverage 
and a more favorable change in 
CFO over the two-year period 
ending with the adoption date 
compared to late-adopting 
firms. 
Firms electing early adoption 
of SFAS No. 95 will have higher 
levels of private debt leverage 
and a more favorable change in 
CFO in the two-year period 
ending with the adoption date 
compared to late-adopting 
firms. 
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The measure of leverage will be that used by Lys (1984). 
The numbers in parentheses are COMPUSTAT line items: 
Leverage = Book value of long-term debt (1) 
Market value of equity [(#24) times (#25)] 
(COMPUSTAT line item #24 is "number of shares of common stock" 
and line item #25 is "market value per share.") 
The book value of long-term private debt and long-term public 
debt will be determined from proxy statements. 
3.3 SIZE HYPOTHESIS 
Size has been found to be a significant determinate of 
management's choice of accounting procedures that affect 
income [e.g., Blacconiere et ale (1991), Ayres (1986), 
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)]. Size also has been shown to 
influence managementVs choice of placement within the 
financial statements of items that do not affect income [Wong 
(1988)], to be a significant factor in determining investors' 
reactions to quarterly earnings disclosures [Bamber (1987)] 
and to be a significant determinate of management's choice of 
voluntary disclosures [Chow and Wong-Boren (1987)]. One of 
the hypothesized reasons for the influence of size on 
management's voluntary disclosures is the existence of 
information production costs [Cushing and LeClere (1992)]. 
The decision to adopt SFAS No. 95 early carries with it 
57 
significant information production costs, in no small part 
because of the preference of the FASB for restating the prior 
year to conform to the new presentation in comparative 
financial statements. Larger companies may have larger 
accounting staffs or may experience economies of scale such 
that the relative importance of the added costs of adopting 
SFAS No. 95 early is of less importance to larger firms. This 
leads to the fourth hypothesis, stated in the alternative 
form: 
Firms electing 
of SFAS No. 95 
compared to 
firms. 
early adoption 
will be larger 
late-adopting 
Size has been measured in a variety of ways by different 
researchers (see Table 3). The most frequently used measures 
are assets (at book value, COMPUSTAT item # 120) and sales 
(COMPUSTAT item # 12). This study will incorporate each of 
these two measures in two separate prediction models. 
3.4 MANAGEMENT CONTROL HYPOTHESIS 
A number of studies have shown that the degree of 
ownership of a firm by its managers influences the accounting 
choices [e.g., Dhaliwal et al. (1982), Ayres (1986)] and 
disclosure choices [Ruland et al. (1989)] of the firm. The 
basic argument is that managers of firms whose ownership is 
diffuse (management controlled firms) have considerable 
discretion in guiding the affairs of the firm compared to the 
discretionary power of managers in firms whose ownership is 
concentrated (owner controlled firms). Studies of managers' 
choice of accounting procedures generally hypothesize that 
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managers tend to choose the procedure that maximizes their 
income-based bonuses, if management has a high degree of 
control. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) state that "When managers 
exercise this discretion it can be because (1) the exercised 
discretion increases the wealth of all contracting parties, or 
(2) the exercised discretion makes the manager better off at 
the expense of some other contracting party or parties (pg. 
135)." The first action is said to be acting "efficiently," 
and the second action is said to be acting 
"opportunistically." 
Virtually all studies of accounting choice have assumed 
that managers have acted opportunistically. (As a result, 
positive accounting theory is viewed by most researchers as 
simply a theory of management's self-interest rather than as 
an economic theory of maximization of firm value, the view 
held by Watts and Zimmerman). 
Hypothesis number one states that managers will react to 
"good news" by publicizing it; specifically, by adopting SFAS 
No. 95 early. This action by management would be expected in 
all situations where the recent change in CFO constitutes 
"good news" if managers act for the benefit of all parties 
(L e., act efficiently), regardless of management's ability to 
benefi t directly from the disclosure of "good news." However, 
if managers are motivated only by self-interest (Le, act 
opportunistically) they will release "good news" only if the 
disclosure will be to their personal benefit. 
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To strengthen the ability of this study to investigata 
this area, a measure of benefit to managers from an increase 
in share price is needed. The number of shares held by 
officers and directors is such a measure, as well as being an 
accepted measure [e.g., this is the measure used in Ayres 
(1986), Trombley (1989), Ruland et ale (1990) and Dunne (1990) 
of the degree of management control of the firm]. This study 
will add an additional measure, ownership of stock options, of 
the direct benefit to a manager of an increase in the firm's 
share price. 
The percentage of the firm's outstanding shares owned by 
officers and directors and the number of options held will be 
taken from proxy statements. The end-of-period share price 
also will be taken from proxy statements. The measure of 
stock options that will enter the prediction model will be 60% 
of the share price multiplied by the number of· options, 
following the procedure used by Dechow and Sloan (1991) to 
control for the smaller dollar change in the value of a stock 
option for a given dollar change in the value of the 
underlying stock. This discussion leads to hypotheses five 
and six, which are stated in the null form, as opportunistic 
behaviQr by managers is not assumed in this study: 
There will be no difference in 
the degree of management 
control between firms that 
elect early adoption of SFAS 
No. 95 compared to late-
adopting firms. 
There will be no difference in 
the value of management's stock 
options between firms electing 
early adoption of SFAS No. 95 
compared to late-adopting firms. 
3.5 NEW CAPITAL ISSUANCE HYPOTHESIS 
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The voluntary disclosure of information may be related 
to new capital offerings by the firm. The addition of stock 
or debt to the firm's capital structure increases agency costs 
[Jensen & Meckling (1976)], and additional disclosures reduce 
agency costs [Ruland et ale (1990)]. New capital offerings 
shortly after the release of voluntary earnings forecasts by 
management were found to be a significant factor in explaining 
management's voluntary disclosure of the forecasts [Ruland et 
ale (1990)]. This leads to the seventh hypothesis, stated in 
the alternative form: 
Firms electing early adoption of SFAS No. 
95 will be more likely to raise new 
capital in the year following the 
adoption year compared to late-adopting 
firms. 
Ruland et ale (1990) used the three-month period 
following the release of the forecast as the relevant period 
to apply the search for new capital offerings. They stated 
that they would have preferred a longer period but that a 
longer period would have contamina'ted their study by including 
the release of the actual earnings report in the period. One 
year appears reasonable, and allows the proxy statement for 
the year following the adoption as a source of data regarding 
new capital issuances. 
3.6 AUDITOR EFFECT HYPOTHESIS 
One explanation for observed accounting and disclosure 
choices, particularly where management is essentially 
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indifferent about the choice, is the preferences of other 
participants in the financial reporting process. Researchers 
[e.g., Trombley (1990), Kinney and McDaniel (1989)] have 
observed a relationship between the firm's outside auditor and 
the firm's accounting or disclosure choices. It is reasonable 
to expect that a "Big Six" auditing firm would be more likely 
to encourage its clients to adopt the reporting requirements 
early when compared to a smaller auditing firm, in part 
because of the extensive educational programs regarding the 
latest FASB pronouncements conducted in-house in the larger 
auditing firms. This leads to the eighth hypothesis, stated 
in the alternative form: 
Firms electing early adoption of SFAS No. 
95 will be more likely to have engaged a 
Big Six auditing firm compared to 
late-adopting firms. 
Data regarding the auditor in the year of adoption will be 
taken from the proxy statements. 
3.7 CONSISTENCY HYPOTHESIS 
The decision to adopt SFAS No. 95 earlier than the 
effective date of fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 
1988 carries with it the acceleration of bookkeeping and 
audi ting costs which otherwise could be postponed until a 
later year. Firms that have previously switched the emphasis 
of their funds statement from working capital to cash have 
already incurred the bulk of these costs, and should be 
expected to adopt SFAS No. 95 with fewer added costs than 
those firms that maintained the working capital basis for 
their funds statement. This reasoning leads to the ninth 
hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
Firms electing early adoption of SFAS No. 
95 will be more likely to have used the 
cash basis for their funds statement 
in the year preceding adoption 
of SFAS No. 95 compared to late-
adopting firms. 
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The nomenclature "consistency hypothesis" is drawn from Lilien 
and Pastena (1982) who used similar reasoning to hypothesize 
that bookkeeping and other costs would influence management's 
choice of accounting procedures in the oil and gas industry. 
3.8 THE PREDICTION MODEL 
The following model will be used in a logistic 
regression to estimate the likelihood of early adoption of 
SFAS No. 95 by a firm. The reasons for using a logistic 
regression instead of an ordinary least squares (OLS) or 
discriminant regression, and the selection of a sample, as 
well as the need for any univariate statistics, will be 
developed in sections 3.9 and 3.10 of this Chapter. 
The model is: 
probability 
of early 
adoption 
of 
SFAS No. 95 
where: 
A CFO 
PUBLEV 
PRILEV 
SIZE 
= a + b 1 ACFO + b2 PUBLEV (A CFO) 
+ b 3 PRILEV (A CFO) + b4 SIZE + bs MC 
+ b 6 OPTIONS + b7 NEWCAP + b8 AUDITOR 
+ b9 PRIOR 
= Percentage change in CFO over the two-
year period ending with the adoption date 
= Degree of public leverage 
= Degree of private leverage 
= Size 
MC 
OPTIONS 
NEW CAP 
AUDITOR 
PRIOR 
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= Degree of management control 
= Value of management's options 
= New capital issuances within one year 
= Type of auditor in adoption year, and 
= Emphasis of funds statement in year prior 
to adoption year 
CFO, PUBLEV, PRILEV, MC and OPTIONS are as defined in 
previous sections of this Chapter. Size will be measured in 
two ways: sales (net sales), and book value of total assets. 
Sales will be used in the first iteration; book value of total 
assets in the second. NEWCAP is a dichotomous variable where 
1 = new capital was issued and 0 = new capital was not issued. 
AUDITOR is a dichotomous variable where 1 = the auditor was 
one of the "Big six" and 0 = the auditor was not one of the 
"Big six." PRIOR is a dichotomous variable where 1 = cash was 
the emphasis of the funds statement in the year prior to 
adoption of SFAS No. 95 and 0 = working capital was the basis 
of the funds statement in the year prior to adoption of SFAS 
No. 95. 
All coefficients are predicted to be positive except b s 
(degree of management control) and b6 (value of management's 
options) . No prediction is made regarding these; the 
interpretation of their coefficients and significance is a 
major contribution of this study. Additionally, b 2 (public 
leverage) is predicted to be greater than b3 (private 
leverage). Predicted signs of the regression coefficients are 
shown in Table 4. 
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3.9 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The results of a review of Accountinq Trends and 
Techniques [AICPA (1977-90)] are shown in Table 1. The 
earliest year in which a significant number of firms adopted 
the title "Cash Flows" for their funds statement is 1987, when 
90 firms adopted this nomenclature. The research sample will 
consist of these 90 firms plus other firms drawn at random 
'I;'lhich adopted SFAS No. 95 in their financial statements for 
fiscal years ending in 1987. The objective will be to obtain 
a usable sample of 109 firms or more. 
Aldrich and Nelson (1984, pg. 53) state that a Logit 
sample size on the order of N-K= 100 should yield a reasonable 
approximation of the results of large sample sizes. Sample 
sizes used in selected other studies are shown in Table 5. 
Random control group vs. Hatched pairs 
The use of a random control group admits into the 
research the possibility that the results are driven by 
omitted variables [Daley and Vigeland (1983)]. For example, 
if certain firm characteristics such as the optimal leverage 
ratio vary with industry, the power of a test designed to test 
for the effect of leverage on a firm' s decisions will be 
strengthened if the control group is constructed by matching 
on industry, rather than being chosen at random. However, 
this matching may limit the variation of other explanatory 
variables, thus reducing their power to discriminate [Daley 
and Vigeland (1983)]. 
Some positive accounting researchers [e.g., Ruland et 
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ale (1990)] have constructed control groups matched on 
industry by matching on four, three, or two digit standard 
Industrial Codes (SIC codes). Others [e.g., Ayres (1986)] 
have constructed random control groups and presented details 
of the test results based on comparison of the effects group 
to the random control group. Details of the industry 
composition of the effects group and the control group (by SIC 
code) were presented in tabular form. They also constructed 
a control group consisting of firms matched by industry and 
presented only the highlights of the second test. Other 
[e.g., Hunt (1985)] have omitted a common variable, size, from 
the independent variables in the prediction equation but 
constructed a control group based on size (and on industry by 
SIC code). 
In order to maximize the power of the model proposed in 
this study, the use of a random control group is proposed. As 
did Ayres (1986), details of the industry composition of the 
effects firms and of the control firms (by SIC code) will be 
presented in tabular form. A second control group consisting 
of firms matched by four or three digit SIC codes will be 
constructed and the test run a second time. Significant 
differences in the results of the two tests will be 
highlighted. 
3.10 STATISTICAL METHODS EMPLOYED 
Univariate tests 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test of differences between means 
will be used to test whether those firms that adopted SFAS No. 
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95 early were drawn from the same population as those that did 
not. The wilcoxon rank sum test is a non-parametric test that 
can be used without making the assumptions that the 
observations are normally distributed and have equal variances 
[Canavos (1984)J. In addition, another popular non-parametric 
test, the Kolmogorov-Sm':'rnov test, will be run and the 
differences between it and the wilcoxon test will be noted. 
Multivariate test 
A mUltivariate logistic regression provides an estimate 
of the explanatory ability of each of the independent 
variables in the prediction equation, if severe 
multicollinearity between the independent variables is not 
present. A test of multi-collinearity will be performed and 
the final regression model will omit independent variables 
that are highly (R2 > .80) [Lee and Hsieh (1985)J correlated. 
The test of multi-collinearity will be to regress each of the 
independent variables on all other independent variables, as 
done in Daley and Vigeland (1983). 
The mUltivariate regression model of choice when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous and the explanatory 
variables are not normally distributed is Logit [Maddala 
(1991) J. Both Logit and a related model, Probit, were 
designed to overcome the violation of the homoskedasticity 
assumption of the error terms in OLS regression models which 
occurs when the dependent variable is dichotomous, as is the 
case here. Logit assumes that the dependent variable is an 
estimate of the probability that an observation belongs in one 
67 
of two groups. Logit assumes that the probability density 
function describing the relation between the dependent and 
independent variables is logistic rather than normal and is 
described by the relation Y i * = :E b"xik + u i where y* represents 
the latent (i.e., unobservable) preference for an alternative 
[Aldrich and Nelson (1984)]. Recent choice studies [e.g., 
Ayres (1986)] have employed Logit. 
3.11 EVALUATION OF THE LOGIT MODEL AND USE OF 
JACKKNIFE PROCEDURE 
In order to evaluate the significance of the overa~l 
logit model, a pseudo-R2 measure will be developed, the 
interpretation of which is analogous to that of the R2 in an 
OLS regression model. Also, a jackknife procedure will be 
used. A jackknife procedure is one in which each observation 
is treated as a hold-out sample and an estimate of the 
probability of the dependent variable is made using all the 
other observations. 
3.12 SUMMARY 
The test of the predictive ability of a model that 
explains management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 
will be accomplished by use of a logistical regression 
procedure. In addition to that mUltivariate procedure, the 
non-parametric wilcoxon and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests will be 
used to determine differences between the sample and control 
means of the independent variables in the model. A test of 
multicollinearity will be performed and the final regression 
model will not contain variables for which collinearity is a 
problem. 
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The primary results will be based on a comparison of 
firms that adopted SFAS No. 95 early to a random sample of 
firms that did not. A second test will be conducted using a 
control group matched on SIC codes to the sample group. 
Significant differences between the second and first tests 
will be reported. 
Chapter Four 
Analysis of Results 
This Chapter presents the results of the data collection 
and statistical analyses. The sample selection process is 
explained first. Then the results of the univariate and 
mUltivariate procedures are presented and analyzed. The 
Chapter ends with conclusions and a final comment regarding 
the sample. 
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
Based on a review of Accountinq Trends and Techniques 
[AICPA (1977-90)] as shown in Table 1, the earliest year in 
which a significant number of firms adopted the title "Cash 
Flows" for their funds statement is 1987, when 90 firms 
adopted this nomenclature. These 90 firms plus additional 
firms drawn at random which used cash as the basis of their 
funds or cash flow statement in the fiscal year ending in 1987 
formed the sample for this study, subject to the following 
conditions: (1) The proxy statements for these firms, as 
quoted in the COMPAC DISCLOSURE CD-ROM data base, had to 
provide the number of shares owned by officers and directors, 
and (2) Annual reports for these firms for the fiscal years 
ending in 1986, 1987 and 1988 had to be available in the 
Cabell Library of Virg inia Commonwealth University. These 
conditions had no significant impact on the elements in the 
sample. The objective was to obtain a usable sample of 109 or 
more firms, as Aldrich and Nelson (1984, pg. 53) state that a 
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Logit sample size on the order of N-K=100 should yield a 
reasonable approximation of the results of large sample sizes. 
A sample of 218 firms was obtained, 109 of which used cash as 
the basis of their funds or cash flow statement for the fiscal 
year ending in 1987 (Early Adopters) and 109 of which used 
working capital as the basis of their funds or cash flow 
statement in the fiscal year ending in 1987 (Control Group). 
The composition of the sample is given in the Exhibit 3. The 
sample does not include firms in regulated industries or 
financial institutions, as their freedom to make disclosure 
decisions is limited compared to other firms [Daley and 
Vigeland (1983)]. The most well represented industry is 
medium and heavy manufacturing (SIC codes in the 3000's) with 
64 firms in the 218-firm sample. The second and third most 
well represented industries are light manufacturing (SIC codes 
in the 2000's) with 48 firms and wholesale and retail trade 
(SIC codes in the 5000's) with 30 firms in the sample. 
Table 6 provides a descriptive summary of the variables 
used in the study. Extreme observations were noted for 9 of 
the 218 observations for the single variable of percentage 
change in cash flow from operations (CPO). To attempt to 
minimize the effect of these 9 extreme observations, the 
percentage change in CPO was coded as 999.9% or -999.9% even 
though the observed change in CPO exceeded a 1000% change. 
This limiting procedure is taken from [Ayres (1986)] in which 
a similar procedure was followed. 
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Industry Control 
Of the total sample of 218 firms, 112 were matched on 3 
and 4-digit SIC codes; 56 Early Adopters and 56 in a Control 
Group. statistical analyses were run twice; once for all 218 
firms and once for only the 112 firms matched on 3 and 4-digit 
SIC codes. This procedure follows Daley and vigeland (1983) 
who state that the use of an industry-matched control group 
strengthens the power of a test of certain firm 
characteristics if these characteristics (such as leverage) 
tend to vary by industry, while the use of a more random 
control group strengthens the power of the test of firm 
characteristics for which industry-matching may limit 
variation. Tables 7 and 8 provide descriptive summaries of 
the variables used in this study on a basis of an industry-
matched sample and a more random sample. 
4.2 RESULTS OF THE UNIVARIATE TESTS 
Non-parametric tests of the differences between 
means were used to test whether those firms that adopted SFAS 
No. 95 early were drawn from the same population as those that 
did not. Non-parametric tests can be used without making the 
assumptions that the observations are normally distributed and 
have equal variances [Canavos (1984)]. The results of two 
popular non-parametric tests are reported in Tables 9 and 10: 
the Wilcoxon rank sum test, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
test. 
Presentation of Results 
The Wilcoxon rank sum test applied to the total sample of 
72 
218 firms (Table 9) shows that four variables are highly 
significant: Size (whether measured by sales or by assets) 
(SIZE) (.0001), value of management's options (OPTIONS) 
(.0001), the basis (cash or working capital) of the funds 
statement used in the preceding fiscal year (PRIOR) (.0001), 
and the degree of management control (MC) (.0006). The K-S 
test also shows that SIZE (whether measured by sales or by 
assets), OPTIONS, PRIOR and MC are significant at .0015 or 
better. The other variables are not significant at a level of 
.10 or better. 
An examination of the industry-matched companies (Table 
10) shows that SIZE (whether measured by sales or by assets), 
OPTIONS, Me and PRIOR remain highly significant, all being 
significant at the .0013 level or better. The change in CFO 
moves to a marginally significant level (.1032) when 
controlled for industry and measured by the Wilcoxon test. 
The other variables remain insignificant in the industry-
matched sample. 
Discussion of Results 
H1 predicts that firms electing early adoption of SFAS 
No. 95 will have increased CFO in the two-year period ending 
with the year of adoption, compared to late-adopting firms. 
The reasoning is that an increase in CFO is a measure of "good 
news," which has been shown to motivate managers to make 
disclosures [Lev and Penman (1990)]. The experimental results 
do not confirm this hypothesis. Rather, firms disclosing CFO 
in 1987 have a lower two-year change in CFO than those that 
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maintain the disclosure of working capital. 
H2 predicts that firms electing early adoption of SFAS 
No. 95 will have higher levels of public debt leverage 
(PUBLEV) and a more favorable change in CFO over the two-year 
period ending with the adoption date, compared to late-
adopting firms. The reasoning is that higher leverage implies 
more risk of violation of a debt covenant agreement; if a firm 
has high leverage and a favorable change in CFO, managers will 
be motivated to disclose the favorable change in CFO. The 
variable PUBLEV is multiplicative with the variable change in 
CFO, if change in CFO is positive. The experimental results 
do not support this hypothesis because PUBLEV does not achieve 
significance at a level of .10 or better on either an 
industry-matched or full-sample basis. 
H3 is concerned with the degree of private leverage 
(PRILEV) and the adoption date of SFAS No. 95. The prediction 
and reasoning is the same for PRILEV as for PUBLEV. However, 
PRILEV is predicted to be less significant in the choice of 
adoption date of SFAS No. 95 than PUBLEV because PRILEV is 
easier to renegotiate. 
support this hypothesis 
The experimental results do not 
because PRILEV does not achieve 
significance at a level of .10 or better on either an 
industry-matched or full-sample basis. 
H4 predicts that firms electing early adoption of SFAS 
No. 95 will be larger compared to late-adopting firms. The 
reasoning is that larger companies may experience economies of 
scale such that the relative importance of the added costs of 
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adopting SFAS No. 95 early is of less importance to the larger 
firms. This SIZE hypothesis is strongly (.0018 level or 
better) supported by both the Wilcoxon and K-S tests on both 
the industry-matched and full samples and whether SIZE is 
measured by sales or by assets. 
Hs is concerned with the degree of management control 
(Me) of the firms. Hs is stated in the null form: there is 
no difference in Me between early and late-adopting firms. 
H6 is concerned with the value of management' s stock 
options (OPTIONS).. H6 is also stated in the null form, 
predicting no difference in OPTIONS between early and late-
adopting firms. Hs and H6 are both rejected by the 
experimental results. Both Me and OPTIONS are highly (.0015 
or better) significant for the full 218-member sample whether 
significance is measured by the wilcoxon or K-S tests. The 
results are virtually unchanged for the 112-member industry-
matched sample. 
The experimental results concerning Me and OPTIONS were 
to be evaluated to uncover evidence regarding the "efficiency" 
or "opportunism" of management's actions. If managers release 
"good news" in all cases, thus raising share prices for all 
concerned, they are said to be acting "efficiently." If they 
release "good news" only when they stand to profit personally 
from the presumed rise in share prices (as measured by 
OPTIONS) they are said to be acting "opportunistically." No 
clear conclusions can be reached regarding "efficient" or 
"opportunistic" behavior on the part of managers. A major 
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problem in reaching a conclusion in this area is the lack of 
strong significance of the "good news" or change in CFO 
measure. If the lack of significance of the change in CFO is 
ignored, the experimental results may be interpreted as 
providing evidence in favor of the "efficient" behavior of 
managers. In both the entire sample and the industry-matched 
sample, MC is higher for the late-adopters while OPTIONS is 
higher for the early adopters. However, OPTIONS and SIZE are 
significantly positively correlated (.0001 level; see Tables 
11 and 12) and SIZE is a significant predictor of early 
adoption. Therefore, OPTIONS may be acting as a surrogate for 
SIZE. 
H7 predicts that early adopters will be more likely to 
raise new capital in the year following the adoption year, 
compared to late-adopting firms. The reasoning is that 
addi tional disclosures reduce agency costs associated with the 
issuance of additional debt or equity. This hypothesis is not 
supported by the experimental results on either an industry-
matched or a full-sample basis. 
Hs predicts that early adopters will be more likely to 
have used the services of a Big six auditing firm, compared to 
late-adopters. This hypothesis is not supported by the 
experimental results on either an industry-matched or a full-
sample basis. Interestingly, none of the 218 firms in the 
sample experienced a switch of auditing firms in the years 
1986, 1987 or 1988. 
H9 predicts that firms electing early adoption of SFAS 
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No. 95 will be more likely to have used cash as the basis of 
their funds statement for the year preceding adoption of SFAS 
No. 95, compared to late-adopting firms. The reasoning is 
that the bookkeeping costs associated with adoption of SFAS 
No. 95 will be less for a firm that already prepares its funds 
statement on a cash basis. This hypothesis is highly 
supported by the experimental results. The significance level 
of PRIOR is .0001 whether tested by the wilcoxon or K-S test 
on either the entire sample or the industry-matched sample. 
Conclusion 
The experimental results of univariate tests support the 
significance of size, whether measured by sales or by assets, 
the degree of management control, the value of management's 
options and the basis of the prior year's funds statement in 
the choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 by management. 
4.3 RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE TEST 
The logistical regression (Logit) test provides an 
estimate of the explanatory ability of each of the independent 
variables in the prediction equation, if severe 
multicollinearity between the independent variables is not 
present, and is the method of choice in the present situation, 
where· the dependent variable is dichotomous [Maddala (1991)]. 
Using a definition of severe multicollinearity of R2 > .80 
[Lee and Hsieh (1985)], all that is necessary is not to have 
both size measures (sales and assets) present in the same 
regression equation. The correlation coefficients are given 
in Tables 11 and 12. 
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Presentation of Results 
The entire Logit model is highly significant, whether 
size is measured by sales (Table 13) or by assets. The entire 
Logit model is significant at the .0001 level and shows a C 
(test of fit) score of .935. Also, when a jackknife procedure 
is used, 91% are properly classified, whereas 50% would be the 
naive probability of success. A jackknife procedure is one in 
which each observation is treated as a hold-out sample and an 
estimate of the probability of the dependent variable is made 
using all the other observations. It is performed by the 
CTABLE option of the SAS version 6 logistical regression 
procedure. 
However, individual variables tend to be insignificant. 
Only the type of auditor and the basis of the prior year's 
funds statement were significant at the .053 level or better 
in a Logit model of all 218 companies with sales as the size 
measure (Table 13). To attempt to explore this, the 
probability measure in the correlation table (Table 11) was 
used rather than the R2 > .80 rule as a. measure of severe 
multicollinearity and a number of other regressions were run. 
The more interesting of these are detailed in Table 14. These 
regressions show the change in CPO and the degree of 
management control to be more significant, but only at the 
expense of the overall significance of the model. 
Interestingly, a model which omits the basis of the prior 
year's funds statement as a variable shows both the change in 
CPO and the degree of management control to be significant at 
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the .0446 level or better while maintaining an overall 
significance level of .0398. This adds support to the 
findings of the univariate tests that showed the change in CFO 
and the degree of management control to be significant factors 
in explaining management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 
95. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Based on both mUltivariate and univariate procedures, 
this study provides evidence that the change in CFO, the size 
of the firm, the degree of management control, the value of 
management's options and the basis of the funds statement in 
the prior year are significant variables that explain 
management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95. 
4.5 COMMENT RE 1987 AS A MEASURE OF "EARLY" 
The year 1987, chosen as a measure of early adoption, may 
not be as "early" as would be implied by the fact that it was 
the first year that a significant number of companies changed 
the title of their funds statement from "statement of Changes 
in Financial Position" to "Cash Flow Statement." Several 
instances of cash being used as the basis of the funds 
statement even though it was entitled "statement of Changes in 
Financial Position" were observed. If 1987 is not "early," 
the importance of the variable "basis of funds statement in 
prior year" would be exaggerated. Also, the importance of the 
other variables in the prediction equation may be different 
from their importance at the time of the true "early" 
79 
adoption. For example, the firm's degree of leverage may have 
changed from the time of the true "early" adoption. 
Chapter Five 
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been to develop a model to 
explain and predict management's choice of adoption date of 
statement of Financial Accounting standards No. 95, entitled 
"statement of Cash Flows" (SFAS No. 95) [FASB (1987)]. 
Evidence from existing research was cited [e.g., Lev and 
Penman (1990)] to establish that the release of cash flow 
information is viewed by management as the release of a 
signal. Robust hypotheses from the positive accounting 
literature were tested for their effect on management's choice 
of adoption date of SFAS No. 95. In addition, the value of 
management's stock options was tested for its ability to 
affect this choice. 
5.1 SUMMARY 
A logistical regression model was developed with a highly 
significant (.0001) ability to distinguish between early and 
late adopters of SFAS No. 95. In this model, the explanatory 
variable of "basis of funds statement used in prior year" 
overpowered the explanatory ability of the other variables. 
However, univariate statistical analyses showed that the early 
and late adopters were drawn from populations which differed 
significantly in size, in degree of management control, and in 
the value of management's stock options. In addition, the 
change in cash flows from operations and the degree of 
management control are significant at the .05 level in a 
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logistical regression which omitted the variable "basis of 
funds statement used in prior year." This Logi t model had 
overall significance at the .04 level. 
Size, the degree of management's control and the 
percentage change in a performance measure are robust 
hypotheses in positive accounting studies that explain and 
predict management's choice of accounting methods that affect 
reported net income. since these same variables have been 
found to affect management's choice of adoption date of SFAS 
No. 95, this study presents evidence that management values 
and/or believes that investors value cash flows in the same 
manner that they value accounting net income information. 
This finding adds to the research concerning the importance of 
cash flows. 
A relatively unexplored variable, the value of 
management's stock options, was found to influence 
management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95 (.0001 
level; see Tables 9 and 10). Since this study was conducted 
under the positive accounting theory framework, this study is 
of value in that it adds to the literature examining the value 
of management's options, which at present cannot be included 
in a list of the robust hypotheses of positive accounting. 
This finding should be of value to the FASB as they prepare an 
exposure draft of a SFAS in the area of the valuation of 
employee stock options [FASB (1992)]. 
5.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
The contributions of the study are discussed in this 
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section, which is organized according to the "Expected 
contributions of the study." 
1. Additions to the literature concerning the importance 
of cash flows. Neill et al. (1991) call for careful research 
into cash flows and accruals that will "contribute to the 
emerging literature and our understanding of the economic role 
of accounting information (pg. 145)." Size, the degree of 
management's control and the percentage change in a 
performance measure are robust hypotheses in positive 
accounting studies (e.g., Zmijewski and Hagerman [1981], 
Niehaus [1989], Ayres [1986]) that explain and predict 
management's choice of accounting methods that affect reported 
net income. Since these same variables have been found (at 
the .0006 level or better; see Tables 9 and 10) to affect 
management's choice of adoption date of SFAS No. 95, this 
study presents evidence that management values and/or believes 
that investors value cash flows in the same manner that they 
value accounting net income information. This finding adds to 
the research concerning the importance of cash flows. 
2. Integration of accounting and finance literature. 
The signaling literature (e.g., Miller and Rock [1985]) is 
principally in the finance area. This study finds that some 
of the same variables that affect management's choice of 
adoption date of SFAS No. 95 are variables that have been 
found robust in other positive accounting studies concerning 
income-affecting choices (e.g., Johnson and Ramanan [1988]). 
Since the decision to disclose cash flows early is not one 
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that affects income, but is motivated by the same factors as 
a decision that affects income, the implication is that 
managers view cash flows as signals of future income flows. 
This finding integrates the accounting and finance literature. 
3. "Efficiency" or "opportunism" of management's 
actions. A proposed contribution of this study was to provide 
a direct test of the two different views of management's 
motivation: efficiency or opportunism. The experimental 
results concerning the degree of management's control and the 
value of management's stock options were to be evaluated to 
uncover evidence regarding the "efficiency" or "opportunism" 
of management's actions. If managers release "good news" in 
all cases, thus raising share prices for all concerned, they 
are said to be acting "efficiently." If they release "good 
news" only when they stand to profit personally from the 
presumed rise in share prices (as measured by the value of 
management's stock options) they are said to be acting 
"opportunistically." 
No clear conclusions can be reached regarding "efficient" 
or "opportunistic" behavior on the part of managers. A major 
problem in reaching a conclusion in this area is the lack of 
strong significance of the "good news" or change in cash flow 
from operations measure. If the lack of significance of the 
change in cash flow from operations is ignored, the 
experimental results may be interpreted as providing evidence 
i.n favor of the "efficient" behavior of managers. In both the 
entire sample and the industry-matched sample, the degree of 
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management's control is higher for the late-adopters while the 
value of management's stock options is higher for the early 
adopters. However, the value of management's stoc]e options 
and the size of the company (SIZE) are significantly 
positively correlated (.0001 level; see Tables 11 and 12) and 
SIZE is a significant predictor of early adoption. Therefore, 
the value of management's stock options may be acting as a 
surrogate for SIZE. Subsequent research is needed to 
discriminate between these two variables. 
4. Providing information to authorities. A proposed 
benefit of this study was to provide information to 
authoritative and regulatory bodies, such as the FASB and the 
Securities and Exchange commission, in proposing new standards 
or regulations or in evaluating existing standards and 
regulations. The FASB currently is considering the accounting 
for employee stock options, with an exposure draft of a SFAS 
in this area planned for the second quarter of 1993 and a 
final SFAS planned for 1994 [FASB 1992]. 
A factor motivating the FASB I S del iberations is that 
existing accounting procedures assign a compensation expense 
of zero when stock options with an exercise price equal to 
market are granted. The FASB believes that stock options have 
a non-zero value. The present study tends to support the 
FASB's call for a revision in accounting for stock options 
because the value of management's stock options was found 
highly significant (.0015 or better) in both the full 218-
member sample and the 112-member industry-matched sample, 
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whether measured by the Wilcoxon or by the K-S test. A copy 
of this study would make a timely and valued submission to the 
FASB. 
5. Value of information to investors and analysts. It 
was proposed that any significant information explaining the 
disclosure choices made by management would be valued by 
investors and financial analysts, as such information may 
influence their resource allocation decisions. The present 
study finds evidence that management values and/or believes 
that investors value cash flows in the same manner that they 
value accounting net income information, and that management 
views the early disclosure of cash flows as the issuing of a 
signal. These findings may be valued by investors and 
financial analysts. 
6. Investigation of the value of management options. 
The value of management's options has been explored in a 
positive study of management choice only by DeChow and Sloan 
(1991). The value of management's options was found highly 
significant in this study, thus adding to the positive 
accounting literature. It may be that this factor will become 
one of the robust hypotheses of positive accounting. 
7. Extension of positive accounting theory into the cash 
flow area. Because the early disclosure of cash flows is not 
a choice that affects accounting net income, positive 
accounting studies involving cash flows have not preceded this 
study. Since some of the same variables that have proven 
robust in accounting choice studies are found significant 
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herein, this study extends the positive theory of accounting 
choice into the area of cash flows. 
5.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Limitations of the study 
The prediction model may have omitted significant 
explanatory variables. These omitted variables may not be 
captured by matching on industry SIC Codes. The variables 
that are used may not be effective proxies for the factors 
they are attempting to measure. For example, the relative 
importance of information production costs may not be captured 
in the variable of firm size. These limitations should be 
considered in any conclusions drawn from the test results. 
Implications for further research 
A number of previous studies (e.g., Healy [1985]) have 
investigated the factors influencing management to adopt a 
particular accounting method in preference to another. with 
the exception of DeChow and Sloan (1991) and the current 
study, the value of management's stock options has not been 
included as an explanatory variable in the studies. Since 
this study finds support for the value of management's stock 
options as an influential variable, a logical implication for 
further research is the replication of previous accounting 
choice studies with the value of management's options as a 
variable (to the degree that options are not a surrogate for 
size). 
Neither the degree of public leverage nor the degree of 
private leverage were found significant in this study. 
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Leverage was measured by Lys' (1984) definition, the book 
value of long-term debt divided by the market value of common 
equity. This measure was chosen because it and Chow's (1982) 
definition performed equally well and superior to other 
measures in a study conducted by Press and Weintrop (1990) 
investigating the use of surrogates for the "actual" 
restrictiveness of debt constraints, and it is the simpler of 
the two measures. Perhaps leverage as measured by chow's 
(1982) measure would prove significant. Chow's (1982) measure 
is the same as Ly!s (1984) measure, except that Chow used the 
sum of the market value of common equity and the book value of 
long-term debt as the denominator rather than just the market 
value of common equity. Chow's (1982) measure will yield 
smaller degrees of leverage than Lys' (1984) measure and the 
use of it might be considered for an extension of this study. 
It was hypothesized that early adopters would be more 
likely to raise new capital in the year following the adoption 
year, compared to late-adopting firms. The reasoning was that 
additional disclosures reduce agency costs associated with the 
issuance of additional debt or equity. New capital offerings 
shortly after the release of voluntary earnings forecasts by 
management were found to be a significant factor in explaining 
management·s voluntary disclosure of the forecasts [Ruland et 
al. (1990)]. Ruland et al. (1990) used the three-month period 
following the release of the forecast as the relevant period 
to apply the search for new capital offerings. They stated 
that they would have preferred a longer period but that a 
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longer period would have contaminated their study (which used 
event-study methodology) by including the release of the 
actual earnings report in the period. This study used a 
period of one year, which appeared reasonable and allowed the 
annual report for the year following the adoption of SFAS No. 
95 as a source of data regarding new capital issuances. New 
capital issuances in the year following the adoption of SFAS 
No. 95 was not found to be a significant factor in explaining 
the choice of adoption date. Perhaps one year is too long a 
period, permitting the issuance of new capital by the firms in 
this study for reasons unrelated to the adoption of SFAS No. 
95. A logical extension of this study would be to explore the 
issuance of new capital in a period shorter than one year 
following the adoption of SFAS No. 95. For example, a three-
month period could be used with data on new capital offerings 
obtained from The Directory of corporate Financing, as done by 
Ruland et ale (1990). 
The current study has iden~ified factors which are 
influential in determining management's choice of the timing 
of an accounting disclosure (the release of cash flow 
information; that is, the adoption of SFAS No. 95.) This 
disclosure does not affect reported net earnings. Several of 
the factors t:lhich have been shown to affect management· s 
choice of accounting procedures that do affect reported net 
income are shown here to affect disclosure choice. The unique 
contribution of this study is the extension of the positive 
accounting theory of choice into the area of non-income-
affecting disclosure choices, specifically cash flow disclosure. 
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TABLE 1 
Number of Firms Reporting Basis of the Funds Statement 
and 
Title of the Statement of Changes in Financial Position 
by year 
1977 - 1989 
Basis of the Funds statement 
'86 '85 '84 '83 '82 '81 '80 '79 '78 '77 
Working capital 202 220 244 286 346 466 541 549 558 557 
Cash 398 380 356 314 254 134 59 51 42 43 
600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
1:itle of 'Chancres' Statement 
'89 '88 '87 '86 '85 '84 
Cash Flows or Flow 600 540 110 20 1 
Funds Flow 7 6 4 4 
Chgs in Fin. position 58 477 565 587 590 
Other title 2 6 9 8 6 
600 600 600 600 600 600 
Source: Accountina Trends & Techniaues 
1988 
1987 
1986 
1985 
1984 
1.983 
1982 
1.981 
1980 
1979 & 
prior 
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TABLE 2 
possible Adoption Dates for a Calendar-Year Firm 
Significant Event 
Cash flow statement required by SFAS No. 95 
Cash flow statement encouraged by SFAS No. 95 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged previously 
Cash flow statement out in exposure draft form 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged previously 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged previously 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged by release 
of SFAC No. 5 and by results of experimentation 
encouraged by FEI 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged by exposure 
draft of SFAC No. 5 and by continuing encourage-
ment of FEI to experiment 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged by continuing 
encouragement of FEI to experiment 
Cash-basis funds statement encouraged by exposure 
draft of a proposed SFAC and by the FEI's announce-
ment of their encouragement of members to experi-
ment with cash flow reporting 
Cash-basis funds statement ~ncouraged by FASB's 
discussion memorandum 
APBO No. 19 permitted cash-basis funds statements 
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TABLE 3 
operational Definitions of Firm Size used in Selected 
Previous Studies 
Study 
Watts & zimmerman 
Bowen, Noreen & Lacey 
Zmijewski & Hagerman 
Dhaliwal, Salamon 
& smith 
Lilien & Pastena 
Ayres 
Chow & Wong-Boren 
Wong 
Trombley 
Niehaus 
Ruland, Tung & George 
Press & Weintrop 
1978 
1981 
1981 
1982 
1982 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1990 
Definition 
Assets, by rank in Fortune 
500 also tested by Sales, 
by rank in Fortune 500 
Sales (two-year average of 
sales) 
Sales (log of net sales) 
Assets 
Sales 
Assets 
Book value of debt plus 
market value of equity 
Sales (log of sales) 
Sales (log of net sales) 
Assets 
Assets 
Sales (log of net sales) 
..... 
T1>..BLE 4 
ExplanatorY Variables and Hypothesized 
Relation to Early Adoption of SFAS No. 95 
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Variable Name Variable Definition ?redicted sign 
CFO 
PUBLEV 
PRILEV 
SIZE 
MC 
·OPTIONS 
NEWCAP 
AUDITOR 
PRIOR 
Two-year change in cash flows Positive 
Degree of public lever~ge 
times change in cash flows 
Degree of privata leverage 
times change in cash. flows 
Size (Assets); Size (Sales) 
Degree of management control. 
Value of management's options 
New capital issuances 
Use of .nBig six" auditor 
Basis of funds statement in 
year prior to adoption 
Positive; > PRILEV 
Positive 
positive 
Not hypothesized 
Not hypothesized 
positive 
Positive 
positive 
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TABLE 5 
Sample Sizes used in Selected Previous Studies 
study: 
Dhaliwal, Salamon & smith 
(1982) 
Healy (1985) 
Healy & Palepu (1990) 
Press & Weintrop (1990) 
Ayres (1986) 
Sample Size 
57 management controlled and 
53 owner controlled 
94 firms examined for'details 
of bonus plans 
126 firms which are close to· 
dividend constraints are 
examined 
83 firms examined for details 
of debt covenants 
i03 early adopters 
129 late adopters 
N 
0 
r-i 
TABLE 6 
SUMMARY STA'I'ISTICS ENTIRE 218-MEMBER SAMPLE 
STANDARD 
VARIABLE* MEAN DEVIATION MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
CFO 43.95 258.42 1,000.00 -1. 000.00 
PUBLEV 2,718.69 16,156.00 179,910.00 0.00 
PRILEV 1,894.68 6,846.78 73,629.00 0.00 
SIZE (ASSETS) 1,645.81 3,310.00 30,792.00· 3.00 
SIZE (SALES) 1,444.40 3,030.64 28,209.00 6.00 
MC 14.50 16.71 86.30 0.00 
OPTIONS 18.72 46.74 416.00 0.00 
NEWCAP .48 .50 1.00 0.00 
AFDITOR .94 .25 1.00 0.00 
PRIOR .42 .49 1.00 0.00 
* CFO, PUBLEV, PRILEV and MC are in percentages. PUBLEV and PRILEV are multiplicative with 
CFO if CFO is positive. SIZE and OPTIONS are in millions. 
C"') 
0 TABLE 7 
r-I SUMMARY STATISTICS SAMPLE NOT MATCHED BY INDUSTRY 
( 1) (2) 
Early Control 
Adopters Group 
(N=109) (N=109) 
Max. Standard Max. Standard 
Va:dabl~* l1mm Min. peviation Mean Min· Deviation 
CFO 11.1 1,000 229.99 76.8 1,000 281.26 
-1,000 -789 
PUBLEV 2,788.8 179,910 17,757.00 2,648.6 134,025 14,463.00 
0 
° 
. PRILEV 1,800.4 73,629 7,652.76 1,988.9 37,465 5,967.25 
0 0 
SIZE 2,164.9 30,792 3,925.40 1,127.7 17,768 2,461.88 
(ASSETS) 9 3 
SIZE 1,980.3 28,209 3,697.49 908.5 16,434 2,050.24 
(SALES 7 6 
MC 11.6 86 15.74 17.4 83 17.23 
0 0 
OPTIONS 22.0 193 34.08 15.4 416 56.61 
0 0 
NEWCAP .4495 1 .50 .5138 1 .50 
0 0 
AUDITOR .9174 1 .27 .9541 1 .21 
0 0 
PRIOR .8257 1 .38 .0000 0 .09' 
° 
0 
* CFO, PUBLEV, PRILEV and Me are in percentages. PUBLEV and PRILEV are multiplicative with 
CPO if CFO is positive. SIZE and OPTIONS are in millions. 
o;t' 
0 TABLE 8 
r-I SUl1MARY STATISTICS INDUSTRY-MATCHED SAMPLE 
(1) (2) 
Early Control 
Adopters Group 
(N=56) (N=56) 
Max. Standard Max. Standard 
Variable* M.ggn l:tin. [2eviation f1.g@ Min. Deviation 
CFO 16.6 1,000 245.31 95.0 . 1,000 298.79 
-1,000 -788 
PUBLEV 1,329.8 36,234 5,412.40 4,648.0 134,025 19,987.00 
0 0 
PRILEV 2,296.0 73,629 9,989.28 1,892.2 37,465 5,305.79 
0 0 
SIZE 2,071.1 30,792 4,387.39 1,320.9 17,768 3,064.30 
(ASSETS) 32 5 
SIZE 1,752.7 28,209 3,853.06 1,062.1 16,434 2,562.53 
(SALES 22 6 
HC 10.0 84 14.20 17.4 83 18.81 
0 0 
OPTIONS 25.0 193 39.80 15.2 288 53.47 
0 0 
NENCAP .9286 1 .50 .5000 1 .50 
0 0 
AUDITOR .8929 1 .26 .. 9464 1 .23 
0 0 
PRIOR 1.0000 1 .31 .0000 0 .00 
0 0 
* CFO, PUBLEV, PRILEV and Me are in percentages. PUBLEV and PRILEV are mUltiplicative with 
CFO if CFO is positive. SIZE and OPTIONS are in millions. 
Ii) 
o 
....; 
Variable 
CFO 
PUBLEV 
PRILEV 
SIZE 
(ASSETS) 
SIZE 
(SALES) 
MC 
OPTIONS 
NEW CAP 
AUDITOR 
PRIOR 
TABLE 9 
NON-PARAMETRIC TESTS OF TilE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIABLES 
HYPOTHESIZED TO AFFECT ADOPTION DATE OF SFAS NO. 95 
(EARLY ADOPTERS AND CONTROL GROUP NOT MATCHED BY INDUSTRY) 
original 
Hypothesis 
(1) 
Early 
Adopters 
(N=l09) 
~ 
1 > 2 11.1 
1 > 2; greater 2,7BB.8 
than PRILEV 
1 > 2 1,300.4 
1 > 2 2,164.9 
1 > 2 1,980.3 
Not 11.6 
Hypothesized 
Not 22.0 
Hypothesized 
1 > 2 .4495 
1 > 2 .9174 
1 > 2 .8257 
(2) 
control 
Group 
(N=109) 
Mean 
76.8 
2,648.6 
1,988.9 
1,127.7 
90B.5 
17.4 
15.4 
.5138 
.9541 
.0000 
significance (one-tail) 
wilcoxon . Kolmogoroy-
Test smirnov Test 
.1924 .2533 
.2129 .2533 
.4068 .7486 
.0001* .0001* 
,0001* ~* 
.0006* .0015* 
.0001* .0001* 
.3444 .9781 
.2713 .9999 
.0001* ~* 
Sample 
Direction 
1 < 2 
1 > 2; greater 
than PRILEV 
1 < 2 
1 > 2 
1 > 2 
1 < 2 
1 > 2 
1 < 2 
1 < 2 
1 > 2 
* significant results; if underlined, indicates significant results that support original hypotheses. 
\0 
o 
r-i 
variatJle 
CFO 
PUBLEV 
PRILEV 
SIZE 
(ASSETS) 
SIZE 
(SALES) 
MC 
OPTIONS 
NEWCAP 
AUDITOR 
PRIOR 
TABLE 10 
NON-PARAMETRIr. TESTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VARIABLES 
HYPOTHESIZED TO AFFECT ADOPTION DATE OF SFAS NO. 95 
(EARLY ADOPTERS AND CONTROL GROUP MATCHED ON 3 AND 4-DIGIT SIC CODES) 
(1) (2) 
Early Control 
Adopters Group 
(N=56) (N=56) 
original 
H~mothesis Mean l1.gM significance {one-tail} 
Wilcoxon Kolmogorov-
Test Smirnov Test 
1 > 2 16.6 95.0 .1032 .2301 
1 > 2; greater 1,329.8 4,648.0 .9174 .9048 
than PRILEV 
1 > 2 2,296.0 1,892.2 .3389 .1528 
1 > 2 2,071.1 1,320.9 .0013* .0002* 
1 > 2 1,752.7 1,062.1 .0013* .0002* 
Not 10.0 17.4 .0072* .0061* 
Hypothesized 
Not 25.0 15.2 .0001* .0032* 
Hypothesized 
1 > 2 .9286 .5000 .7090 .9999 
1 > 2 .8929 .9464 .7027 .9999 
1 > 2 1.0000 .0000 .0001* ,0001* 
Sample 
Direction 
1 < 2 
1 < 2: less 
than PRILEV 
1 > 2 
1 > 2 
1 > 2 
1 < 2 
1'> 2 
1 > 2 
1 < 2 
1 > 2 
". significant results; if underlined, indicates significant results that support original hypotheses. 
!' TABLE 11 
0 CORRELATION MATRIX OF ALL VARIABLES SnOWING DEGREE OF CORRELATION 
r-i (R-SQUARE) AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL FOR 218 COMPANIES: 
109 EARLY ADOPTERS AND 109 COMPANYS IN RANDOM CONTROL GROUP 
SIZE SIZE 
CFO PUBLEV PRILEV ASSETS SALES MC OPTIONS NEWCAP AUDITOR PRIOR 
CFO 1.00000 
0.0000 
PUBLEV 0.41819 1. 00000 
0.0001 0.0000 
PRILEV 0.37176 0.22048 1.00000 
0.0001 0.0195 0.0000 
SIZE-ASSETS -0.03396 -0.07062 -0.08771 1. 00000 
0.7223 0.4594 0.3578 0.0000 
SIZE-SALES -0.03939 -0.05186 -0.07716 0.95920· 1.00000 
0.6801 0.5871 0.4187 0.0001 0.0000 
MC -0.03779 0.09252 0.03015 -0.12352 -0.10594 1.00000 
0.6924 0.3319 0.7523 0.1945 0.2663 0.0000 
OPTIONS 0.13470 -0.04901 -0.07842 0.66726 0.67435 -0.09~50 1. 00000 
0.1568 0.6078 0.4111 0.0001 0.0001 0.3216 0.0000 
NEWCAP -0.08391 -0.05245 -.0.12919 ~0.02757 -0.00665 0.08424 0.08050 1. 00000 
0.3790 0.5829 0.1746 0.7729 0.9445 0.3772 0.3988 0.0000 
AUDITOR 0.10618 0.03175 0.06720 0.08409 0.08742 -0.04441 0.08843 0.10150 1.00000 
0.26p2 0.7397 0.4814 0.3781 0.3594 0.6420 0.3538 0.2869 0.0000 
PRIOR -0.10331 -0.09526 0.03783 0.13602 0.14357 -0.28069 0.11854 -0.07574 0.15767 1. 00000 
0.2784 0.3177 0.6921 0.1527 0.1310 0.0027 0.2132 0.4274 0.0969 0·.0000 
BOLD = R-Square > .80 have been highlighted by printing in bold. 
R-Square > .80 is considered high correlation. 
co 
o 
r-f 
CFO 
PUBLEV 
PRILEV 
TADLE 12 
CORHELA'l'IOH MATRIX OF ALL VARIADLES SHm'lING DEGREE OF COIlIlELhTIOn 
(R-SQUAIlE) AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL FOR 112 COMPAUIES: 
56 EARLY ADOPTERS AND 56 COMPANYS MATCHED ON 3 AND 4-DIGIT SIC CODES 
CFO 
1. 00000 
0.0000 
0.40776 
0.0001 
PUDLEV 
1.00000 
0.0000 
PRILEV 
0.39718 0.18286 1.00000 
0.0001 0.0068 0.0000 
SIZE 
ASSE'l'S 
SIZE 
SALES MC OP'l'IOnS UE\-!Cl\P AUDI'fOR PRIOn 
SIZE-ASSETS -0.01663 -0.00556 -0.06217 1.00000 
0.0071 0.9449 0.3609 0.0000 
SIZE-SALES -0.01881 -0.04058 -0.05640 0.92621 1.00000 
0.7824 0.5512 0.4073 0.0001 0.0000 
MC 
OPTIons 
HEWCAP 
AUDITOR 
PRIOR 
-0.05323 0.00231 0.05817 -0.19293 -0.21731 1.00000 
0.4342 0.9729 0.3927 0.0042 0.0012 0.0000 
0.07214 -0.02104 -0.07023 0.56605 0.55235 -0.15150 1.00000 
0.2890 0.7574 0.3019 0.0001 0.0001 0.0253 0.0000 
-0.02316 -0.06604 -0.06715 0.01559 -0.04494 0.04093 0.05867 1.00000 
0.7338 0.3318 0.3237 0.0109 0.5092 0.4723 0.3807 0.0000 
0.063B1 0.00025 0.02662 0.00593 0.05654 -0.16000 0.06420 -0.00962 1.00000 
0.3484 0.9971 0.6959 0.9307 0.4061 0.0101 0.3455 0.8877 0.0000 
-0.099B3 0.02874 0.01662 0.10001 0.16751 -0.19188 0.09329 -0.10B54 -0.00592 1.00000 
0.141B 0.6731 0.8072 0.0054 0.0133 0.0045 0.1699 0.1100 0.930B 0.0000' 
BOLD t=I R-Square > .80 have been highlighted by printing in bold. 
R-Square > .00 is considered high correlatIon. 
t 
.\ 
'i 
TABLE 13 
DETAILS OF THE LOGIT REGRESSION MODEL 
FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE OF 218 FIRMS 
INCLUDING ALL VARIABLES 
109 
OVERALL MODEL FIT: Significant at .0001 level, based on chi-square 
score of 151.274 with 9 degrees of freedom 
OVERALL MODEL FIT: Results of "Jackknife" hold-out sample procedure: 
Naive success rate: 
Model's success rate: 
OVERALL MODEL FIT: C score .935 
109 correct out of 218 (50%) 
198 correct out of 218" 
(at P = .5000 level) 
Signific~ce of individual elements of the model: 
Change in CFO 
Public Leverage 
Private Leverage 
Size (Sales)* 
Management Control 
options Value 
New capital Issuances 
Type of Auditor 
Basis of Prior Year Funds Statement 
.4560 
.8202 
.8190 
.2484 
.6586 
.3870 
.4018 
.0530 
.0001 
* Results for size measured in assets are essentially unchanged. 
110 
'l'ABLE 1'~ 
EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANCE OF 
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES IN THE 
OVERALL LOG IT REGRESSION MODEL 
VARIATION 
OF 
LOGIT 
PROCEDURE 
A. STEPWISE (i.e., Forward) 
criterion to enter and 
remain in equation, 
significant at .3000 
(Industry Matched) 
B. Same as "A", but 
entire sample of 218 used. 
C. Industry Matched. 
No leverage measures used. 
No Prior Year used. 
D. Same as "C", but 
Prior Year measure is 
included. 
E. Entire sample of 218 used. 
Leverage measures included 
as raw measures. not as 
multiplicative with change 
in CFO. 
No Prior Year measure 
included. 
RESULT 
No equation. 
Prior Year entered first. 
Then Prior Year removed. 
Procedure terminated. 
Equation includes only 
Prior Year as a variable. 
After prior year, type of 
auditor was entered, then 
removed: procedure termi-
nated. Performs virtually 
as well as entire model. 
$ignificance of model 
drops to .1499. 
Management control 
becomes significant at 
.0293. 
Change in CFO becomes 
becomes significant at 
.0846. 
Overall significance 
returns to .0001. 
Type of auditor becomes 
significant at .0071. 
Management control and 
change in CFO become 
insignificant. 
Overall model is signifi-
cant at .0398. 
Management control signi-
ficant at .0086. 
Change in CFO significant 
at .0442. 
Type of auditor becomes 
insignificant. 
Exhibit 1: Sample Funds statement 
(Prior to SFAS No. 95) 
Ace Co. 
111 
statement of Changes in Financial Position 
for the year ended December 31, 19XX 
Sources of working capital: 
From operations: . 
Net income....................................... $ 500,000 
Add: Charges not requiring use of 
workin~ c~pital: 
Deprec~at~on •••••••••••••••••••• fa ••• 
.Amortization ....................... . 
Deferred income taxes .•••.••••.••••• 
other .............................. . 
Total from operations ...•.........•. 
Sale of property, plant & equipt ....•..•.•. 
Increase in long-term debt .......•.•••..... 
Total sources ••••.•..•.••......•..•. 
Uses of working capital: 
Cash diyidends ...••.•......•.••...•..••.•• 
Additions to property, plant & equipt •.•.• 
Total uses ......................... . 
Increases in working capital •••...•. 
80,000 
20,000 
10,000 
5,000 
115,000 
615,000 
100,000 
200,000 
915,000 
120,000 
300,000 
420,000 
$ 495,000 
Increase (Decrease) in Working capital by component: 
Cash and U.S. Treasury Notes .•••..•..•...• 
Trade accounts receivable ••....•...••.••.• 
Inventories .............................. . 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets. 
Notes and accounts payable .•.•.•...••..•.. 
CUrrent maturities of long-term debt .•.•.. 
Accrued expenses including income taxes ... 
Increase in working capital .•••••.. 
$ 200,000 
395,000 
(60,000) 
40,000 
(80,000) 
15,000 
(15,000) 
$ 495,000 
.. 
Exhibit 2: Sample Statement of Cash Flow 
(Using the direct method preferred by SFAS No. 95) 
Ace Co. 
Statement of Cash Flow 
for the year ended December 31, 19XX 
Cash flows from operating activities: 
Cash received from customers •.•.•••.•••.••.•.••• 
Cash paid to suppliers and employe.es ••..••...••• 
Interest received •••••••••••••.•••••..•.••.•.••• 
Interest paid............................ ••••••• 
Inccme taxes paid •.•••••••••••••••.•••..••..•.•• 
Net cash provided by operating activities ••••• 
Cash flows from investing activities: 
Proceeds from sale of property, plant & equip ••• 
Capital expenditures •••••••.••.••••..•.••..•.••. 
Net cash used in investing activities .•..•.••• 
Cash flows from financing activities: 
Net borrowings long-term ••.••.•••..••..••..•.•.. 
Dividends paid •••.•••••••••••.•.••.•....•....••• 
Net cash provided by financing activities ...•. 
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents •....••. 
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year •.. 
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year .•..•.•.. 
$ 4,000,000 
(3,440,000) 
10,000 
(150,000) 
(l00.000) 
100,000 
(300,000) 
200,000 
(l20,OOO) 
Reconciliation of net income to net cash provided by operating 
activities: 
112 
$ 320,000 
(200,000) 
80,000 
200,000 
600,000 
$ 800,000 
Net income •••••••.•••••••••••••.•••...........••• $ 500,000 
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net 
provided by operating activities: 
Depreciation and amortization •.••.... 
Increase in trade accounts receivable 
Decrease in inventories ••.•..•.•••... 
Increase in prepaid expenses and 
other current assets ••••.•...••••.•. 
Increase in notes and accounts payable 
Increase in accrued expenses including 
income taxes .••.•••••.•••.•.•.••..•. 
·Net cash provided by operating activities 
cash 
$ 100,000 
(395,000) 
60,000 
(40,000) 
8C,000 
15.000 (180,000 ) 
$ 320.000 
Exhibit 3 
composition of the Sample 
Showing Ccm~any Name, SIC Code 
and Degree of Matching on 
SIC Code 
113 
Working capital Degree ~c~a~s~h~ ______________________ _ 
of 
Match 
SIC Code Company Name SIC Code Company Name 
1629 
1622 
·1521 
1311 
1311 
Corp. 
.1041 
1041 
2952 
2899 
2895 
2869 
2851 
2851 
2834 
2782 
2761 
2752 
2711 
2647 
2645 
2641 
2522 
2522 
2451 
2322 
2272 
2258 
2252 
2099 
Corp. 
2011 
2011 
3949 
3824 
3731 
Morrison Knudsen Corp. 1 
Slattery Group Inc. 3 
AMRE Inc. 4 
Ensource Inc. 4 
Avalon Corp. 4 
Calahan Mining Corp. 1 
ATLAS Corp. 2 
ELCOR Corp. 2 
FERRO Corp. 2 
CABOT Corp. 2 
International Flavors & .2 
Fragrances, Inc. 
Grow Group Inc. 4 
Standard Brands Paint Co. 4 
ICN Pharmaceuticals Inc. 4 
John Harland Co. 4 
Ennis Business Forms Inc. 2 
American Business Products 2 
Inc. 
A. H. Belo Corp. 4 
IPCO Corp. 4 
Esselte Business Systems 3 
Inc. 
Minnesota Mining & 3 
Manufacturing Co. 
Eldon Industries Inc. 1 
G. F. Corp. 1 
Skyline Corp. 1 
Signal Apparel Co. Inc. 3 
Shaw Industries Inc. 2 
Guilford Mills Inc. 1 
Munsingwear 3 
Stewart Sandwiches Inc. 2 
Smithfield Foods Inc. 3 
IBP. Inc. 2 
Anthony Industries 3 
Daniel Industries 3 
American Shipbuilding Co. 2 
1531 
1623 
1521 
1311 
1311 
1221 
1021 
2992 
2844 
2821 
2834 
2851 
2851 
2834 
2782 
2731 
2721 
2711 
2647 
2648 
2649 
2621 
2911 
2621 
2321 
2211 
2911 
2253 
2051 
2013 
2051 
3944 
3823 
3761 
calton Inc. 
LeMeyers Co Group 
AMREP Corp. 
E I Dupont 
Anadarko Petroleum 
Gulf Resources and 
Chemical. Corp. 
ASARCC Inc. 
Quaker State Corp. 
Avon Products, Inc. 
Quantum Chemical Corp. 
General Nutrition Inc. 
Desoto Inc. 
Insilco Corp. 
Marion Laboratories 
Deluxe Corp. 
McGraw-Hill Inc. 
Meredith Corp. 
Knight-Ridder Inc. 
Scott Paper Co. 
Dennison Mfg. Corp. 
Mead Corp. 
Great Northern Nekoosa 
Corp. 
Tosco Corp. 
Champion International 
Corp. 
Russ Togs, Inc. 
Springs Industries Inc. 
Pacific Resources Inc. 
Aileen Inc. 
Interstate Bakeries 
Sara Lee Corp. 
Ralston Purina 
MatteI Inc. 
General Signal Corp. 
Allied Signal Inc. 
SIC Code 
3714 
3694 
3675 
3674 
3674 
3674 
3662 
3662 
3651 
3585 
3585 
3573 
3573 
3573 
3573 
3569 
3564 
3549 
3541 
3533 
3533 
3533 
3523 
3511 
3511 
3493 
3356 
3241 
3149 
4924 
4924 
4924 
4923 
4922 
4722 
4511 
4511 
4222 
114 
Exhibit 3, page'2 of 3 pages 
Working capital Degree ~C~a~s~h~ ______________________ __ 
of 
Match 
Company Name 
DANA Corp. 4 
Standard Motor Products Co. 2 
AVX Corp. 3 
Advanced Micro Devices 2 
Inc. 
AUGAT, Inc. 3 
International Rectifier 4 
Corp. 
Spartan Corp. 4 
Motorola, Inc. 4 
Emerson Radio Corp. 4 
Fedders Corp. 2 
MESTEK, Inc. 4 
Genicom Corp. 4 
Analog Devices Inc. 4 
Applied Magnetics Corp. 4 
MAl Basic Four, Inc. 4 
General Housewares Corp. 3 
AMPCO Pittsburgh Corp. 3 
Safety Kleen Corp. 3 
Monarch Machine Tool Co. 4 
Smith International Inc. 3 
Presser Industries Inc. 2 
Galveston Houston Co. 3 
Allied Products Corp. 4 
Sequa Corp. 3 
McDermott International 2 
Corp. 
ARX Inc. 2 
Armada Corp. 2 
Southdown Inc. 4 
Suave Shoe Corp. 4 
South Jersey Industries 4 
Inc. 
Cascade Natural Gas Co. 4 
Equitable Resources Inc. 3 
Southern Union Co. 4 
Seagull Energy Corp. 3 
Southwest Airlines Co. 2 
Federal Express Corp. 4 
Delta Airlines 4 
Doughties Foods Inc. 1 
SIC Code 
3714 
3612 
3679 
3634 
3678 
3674 
3662 
3662 
3651 
3561 
3585 
3573 
3573 
3573 
3573 
3561 
3562 
3545 
3541 
3534 
3562 
3531 
3523 
3519 
3524 
3443 
3321 
3241 
3149 
4924 
4924 
4923 
4923 
4923 
4742 
4511 
4511 
4011 
Comnany Name 
Arvin Industries Inc. 
Kuhlman Corp. 
Carlisle Companies Inc. 
Dynamics Corp. of America 
AMP Inc. 
E Systems Inc. 
AYDIN Corp. 
General Instruments Corp. 
Ze"li th Electronics Corp. 
safeguard Scientifics 
Inc. 
Standex International 
Corp. 
Electronic Associates 
Inc. 
Floating Point Systems 
Inc. 
Data General corp. 
Gould Inc. 
Trinova Corp. 
Brenco Inc. 
Acme Cleveland Corp. 
Esterline Corp. 
Dover Corp. 
Federal-Mogul Corp. 
caterpillar Inc. 
Deere & Co. 
Brunswick corp. 
Murray Ohio Mfg. Co. 
CBI Industries, Inc. 
Tyler Corp. 
Giant Group LTD 
stride Rite Corp. 
Diversified Energies Inc. 
Eastern Gas & FUel 
Associates 
MDU Resources Corp. 
ARKLA Inc. 
Sonat Inc. 
GATX Corp. 
Emery Air Freight 
Airborne Freight corp. 
Soo Line corp. 
SIC Code 
'42D 
5944 
5812 
5661 
5411 
5331 
5331 
5331 
5261 
5159 
5141 
5111 
5065 
5065 
5065 
5051 
6794 
6794 
6531 
6411 
6281 
6211 
7999 
7993 
7814 
7349 
7311 
7311 
7311 
7261 
7213 
7011 
8999 
8911 
8911 
8071 
8059 
·. ("' ~ 
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Exhibit 3, page 3 of 3 pages 
Working Capital Degree ~C~a~s~h~ ______________________ __ 
of 
Match 
Company Name 
Arkansas Best Corp. 1 
Gordon Jewelry Corp. 2 
McDonalds Corp. 1 
Interco Inc. 2 
Great A&P Tea Co. Inc. 4 
Family Dollar Stores Inc. 4 
Alexanders, Inc. 2 
AMES Dept. Stores, Inc. 4 
General Host corp. 2 
Dibrell Brothers Inc. 2 
Fleming Cos. Inc. 3 
ALeO Standard Corp. 2 
Anthem Electronics Inc. 2 
Arrow Electroni=s Inc. 2 
Ma=shall Industries 4 
Diversified Industries 2 
Inc. 
Entre Computer Center Inc. 1 
Diana Corp. 1 
Grubb & Ellis Co. 2 
Frank B. Hall & Co. Inc. 4 
Equitec Financial Group 1 
Inc; 
McDonald & Co. Investments 1 
Inc. 
San Juan Racing Assoc. 4 
Showboat Inc. 1 
Industrial Training corp. 3 
A.M. Bldg. Maintenance Ind. 2 
Foote Cone & Belding Ad 2 
Agency 
Mickel Berry Corp. 2 
Inter-PUblic Group of Co's :2 
Inc. 
Service Corp. International 1 
Angelica Corp. 1 
Marriott Corp. 1 
American Express Co. 4 
Elgin National Industries 4 
Inc. 
Stone & Webster :2 
Damon Corp. 1 
Manor Care Inc. :2 
SIC Code 
4000 
5912 
5311 
5651 
5411 
5331 
5331 
5311 
5231 
5143 
5148 
5172 
5088 
5013 
5065 
5081 
6512 
6552 
6552 
6411 
6331 
6144 
7999 
7832 
7813 
7394 
7391 
7321 
7374 
7399 
7392 
7813 
8999 
8911 
8999 
8711 
8062 
Company Name 
Canadian Pacific Ltd. 
Melville corp. 
J. C. Penney Company, Inc. 
GAP Inc. 
. Albertson's Inc. 
F.W. Woolworth 
Dayton Hudson Corp. 
carson Pirie Scott & Co. 
Sherman Wiliams Co. 
MEl Diversified Inc. 
Castle & Cooke, Inc. 
Getty Petroleum Corp. 
AAR corp. 
Genuine Parts Co. 
AVNET Inc. 
AGS Computers Inc. 
Southmark Corp. 
General Development Corp. 
Deltona Corp. 
Alexander & Alexander 
Services Inc. 
ITT Corp. 
American Hoist & Derrick 
Co. 
Ramada Inc. 
General Cinema corp. 
Carolco Pictures Inc. 
Enterra Corp. 
Isomet Corp. 
Dun & Bradstreet Corp. 
Automatic Data 
Processing corp. 
Equifax Inc. 
ERC' International 
MGM united Artists 
Ethyl Corp. 
Dravo Corp. 
Grumman corp. 
Talley Industries Inc. 
American Medical 
International Inc. 
V:iTA 
James Blair Shelton was born in Baltimore, Maryland, in 
1945. He graduated from Wicomico senior High School in 
salisbury, Maryland in 1963, from the University of Maryland 
in College Park in 1967 (B.S.) and from Virginia Tech in 
Blacksburg, Virginia in 1975 (Master of Accountancy). He has 
taught at Virginia Commonwealth university, Radford 
University, Bluefield state College and Mary Washington 
College. 
